## Questionnaire Survey on 5th EL Congress

Berlin, December 16-18, 2016

# Questionnaire Survey on $5^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress 

Held in Madrid on 16-18 December 2016

Ariadni Vardopoulou-Galani
Kostas Mantzouranis
Vangia Lysikatou

This document does not represent the point of view of the Party of the European Left. The interpretation and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

## Contents

Introduction ..... 5
Survey Details ..... 6
PROFILE OF THE DELEGATES .....  .7
1.1 Age, marital and parental status ..... 7
1.2 Education and Internet Use. ..... 10
1.3 Occupation and income ..... 13
1.4 Years of national membership, position in the national party ..... 19
1.5 Participation in trade unions and social movements ..... 24
1.6 Placement on the Left-Right axis ..... 25
1.7 National and European identity ..... 28
2. VALUES OF THE DELEGATES ..... 31
2.1 Attitude towards immigrants ..... 31
2.2 Attitude towards distribution of asylum seekers ..... 34
2.3 Attitude towards economic policy ..... 37
2.4 Attitude towards violence ..... 41
2.5 Attitude towards same sex marriage, abortion, drug use ..... 42

## Introduction

The present survey on the EL is based on the answers given to the questionnaires by the delegates on the $5^{\text {th }}$ Congress of the Party of the European Left, held in Berlin between 16 and 18 December 2016. The survey was contacted by transform! europe. It is the third Survey that is been published. The reports of the previous surveys (Paris 2010 and Madrid 2013) could be found in transform! Europe website.

This sequence of surveys aims to provide on the one hand, the statistical and analytical tools and framework addressing issues useful for the understanding of the radical Left, the party of the European Left and are needed for the elaboration of their policies; and on the other, a record of the transformations taken place as well as of the trends on the views and the profiles of the delegates of the congresses. To that end, an effort has been made, during the elaboration of the questionnaire, to enlarge the aspects of the views of the delegates adding new questions, keeping at the same time all the core questions in order to clarify trends and possible shifts.

The main analytical classification tools were a) age, b) sex and, c) regional profile of the delegates. On some issues this classification revealed significant differences in the delegates' answers. Regional differences were more distinct, especially regarding the answers of delegates representing parties from Eastern Europe.

## Survey Details

- The survey was conducted by Transform! Network during the $5^{\text {th }}$ Congress of the Party of the European Left, held in Berlin on 16-18 December 2016
- Method: Sampling based on self-filling questionnaires
- Languages of questionnaire: English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Czech
- Number of questions: 71, allocated in 6 sections
- Sample size: 149
- The Survey followed the United Nations classification system on European subregions (Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe)


## PROFILE OF THE DELEGATES

### 1.1 Age, marital and parental status

In general, delegates of the $5^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress, held in Berlin (2016), are not of young age, as $68,3 \%$ of them are over 45 years old. Also, compared to the $4^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress, held in Madrid (2013), one can observe that the youngest group of delegates (18-24) and the group of delegates of $35-44$ years of age, are diminished ( $0,7 \%$ from $4 \%$ and $12,4 \% 19 \%$ accordingly), while the age group $55-64$ seems to have remained stable ( $33,1 \%$ from $32 \%$ ), and the number of delegates above 65 years of age are increased ( $20 \%$ from $14 \%$ ). However, the $2^{\text {nd }}$ youngest group of delegates (25-34) is highly increased ( $18,6 \%$ from $8 \%$ ).


Figure 1: Age
The body of delegates is almost equally divided between those who are either married or in a civil relationship ( $42,4 \%$ and $8,3 \%$ accordingly, $50,7 \%$ in total), and those who are unmarried $(32,7 \%)$, widowed $(2,1 \%)$, divorced ( $12,5 \%$ ) or separated $(2,1 \%)$, in contrast with the $4^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress, in which the percentage of either married delegates or in a civil relationship was $60 \%$.


Figure 2: Marital status
It is quite interesting to notice that married women are far less than married men ( $34,8 \%$ and $51,4 \%$ accordingly), and that unmarried women who live alone are far more than men in the same category ( $18,8 \%$ and $8,3 \%$ accordingly). That is possibly explained by the fact that women who are married might be in a disadvantageous position when involved in politics, especially if they become mothers. Also, divorced women seem to have stayed solid since the previous EL Congress ( $13 \%$ from $15 \%$ ), while men have greatly increased ( $12,5 \%$ from $3 \%$ ).


Figure 3: Marital status by sex
Even though there is high decrease of married delegates since the previous EL Congress, the parental status remains the same, or slightly higher ( $64,6 \%$ from $61 \%$ ), thus the majority of delegates who have children remains.


Figure 4: Parental status
However, the difference between the percentage of men and women delegates who have children is not as someone might have expected. In fact, women delegates that are mothers have increased since the $4^{\text {th }}$ EK Congress ( $62,3 \%$ from 53\%), thus mitigating the previous finding of the disadvantageous position of women when involved in politics, and accompanying maternal, political and work duties, while men delegates with children remain stable ( $69,4 \%$ from $68 \%$ ).


Figure 5: Parental status by sex

### 1.2 Education and Internet Use

The delegates of the $5^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress are highly educated, as $84,8 \%$ of them have at least a University degree. More specifically, $27,1 \%$ of the delegates has a University degree, $39,6 \%$ has a Master's degree, and a surprisingly high $18,1 \%$ has a PhD. In comparison with the delegates of the $4^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress there are no big differences. $83 \%$ of them had at least a University degree, so there is a slight increase there. However, the percentage of the delegates who have a Master's degree has decreased ( $39,6 \%$ from $46 \%$ ), though that may be because the amount of delegates with a PhD has increased (18,1\% from 13\%).


Figure 6: Education
There are though some big differences in the highest level of education between men and women. There are $2,9 \%$ of women that have only completed primary school, while there are no men in this category. It is also interesting that there is a much higher percentage of women, whose highest level of education is the Master's degree ( $44,3 \%$ ), while only $35,2 \%$ of men belong to this category. That though must be explained by the fact that the percentage of men that have a $\operatorname{PhD}(28,2 \%)$, is much higher than women ( $8,6 \%$ ). That could possibly be explained by the fact that women may choose to stop their high education as they become mothers.


Figure 7: Education by sex
Concerning the highest level of education according to geographical regions, delegates with the highest education level being the primary school exist only in Southern and Northern Europe ( $2,3 \%$ and $4,5 \%$ accordingly). In comparison with the delegates in the previous EL Congress, the percentages of people that have attained a PhD have highly increased, except in the case of Southern Europe, where it has greatly decreased (4,5\% from $14 \%$ ). It is also interesting that the highest percent of delegates with a Master's degree is in Southern Europe (54,5\%), while in the $4^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress the highest percent was in Northern Europe ( $60 \%$, today $45,5 \%$ ).


Figure 8: Education by region

## Do you use the internet? If yes, where do you use it?



Figure 9: Internet use


Figure 10: Internet use (frequency)
Following the results of the previous survey, we come across of approximately the same use of the internet in terms of frequency and place. There is however a very small amount of delegates who do not use the internet at all $(0,7 \%)$. The same percentage also answered that they never use the internet, in terms of frequency.

### 1.3 Occupation and income

Concerning the current work situation of the delegates the percentages are almost the same with the previous congresses. According to the data only minor differences have been occured. Unemployed people were once again underrepresented in the Congress, while full time employed represents the vast majority of the delegates. The group of retired people is permantly the second bigest group among the delegates of the last three congresses, finding that is compatible with tha age profile of the delegates' body.


Figure 11: Current work situation


Figure 12: Current work situation by region

Coming now to the regional dimension of the current work situation of the delegates the general trend that was displayed by the previous surveys remains as well. Finally, as in the most cases, gender doesn't differentiate the profile of the delegates.


Figure 13: Current work situation by sex

Among the part of the delegates being workers, most people are working for the state $43,6 \%$ on the whole, $37,9 \%$ in the public services and $5,7 \%$ in the state industry whereas $25 \%$ of the delegates are working for the private sector $16,4 \%$ for the services and $9.3 \%$ for the industry. People working in the agriculture are very few.


Figure 14:Workplace

Among the delegates from Northern Europe most people are working in public services ( $55 \%$ of all NE higher than the percentage of people working in public services in the rest of Europe (around 45\%). Most people working in the private services come from

Eastern Europe and most people working in the private industry come from Eastern Europe (19,5\%). Workers in the state industry exist solely in Southern Europe and in Eastern Europe.


Figure 15: Workplace by region

More than half of the working force of the delegates is working as professional and technical labour ( $48.9 \%$ ), whereas only $17.3 \%$ work as clerical and $18 \%$ work as higher administrative work-force. Semi-skilled work force represents only the $1.4 \%$ of the labour force whereas skilled workers represent the $2.2 \%$ and sales people also represent $2.2 \%$ of the labour.


Figure 16: Labour division

Turning on the gender dimension of the division of the labour, we come across as approximately the same percentages with the previous survey.


Figure 17: Labour division by sex
The annual household incomes of the delegates are distributed in a more typical way moving around the two middle income classes. i.e. from 20.001 to 30.000 and from
30.0001 to 50.000 ( 22,1 and 20.6 of the population). People falling into lower incomes i.e. from 1001 to 5000 , from 5.001 to 10.000 and from 10.001 to $20.000(12.5 \%, 6.6 \%$, $14.7 \%$ accordingly). As far as the income category of the very poor household is concerned, incomes up to 1.000 euro seem to be in $7.4 \%$, providing evidence for sharper class distinctions between the delegates of the Congress.


Figure 18: Annual household income


Figure 19: Annual household income by region

A closer inspection of the household income data distribution across regions produces some interesting findings. Adding the percentage of income ranges in various regions, as they are presented in Figure 20 one can come to the following conclusions: In the first place, the vast majority ( $78 \%$ ) of delegates from parties of Eastern Europe has a household income up to 20.00 euro. At the other end lie the delegates from parties of Western, Southern and Northern Europe, with the big majority of them having an annual income over 20.000 Euro ( $86 \%, 70 \%$ and $75 \%$ ).


Figure 20: Annual household income by sex
The Figure 21 shows the financial differences between men and women delegates. Men seem to have a more balanced representation in almost all income categories, while the vast majority of women are concentrated in the categories with household annual income between 20.000 and 50.000 euros.

### 1.4 Years of national membership, position in the national party

The big majority of delegates are old party members: $65 \%$ of them are members of their parties for more than a decade. Men and women are equally distributed in the various categories, finding that represent a change as in Paris Congress men had a ten percentage point lead over women in the "more than 10 years" group.


Figure 21: Years of national party membership


Figure 22: Years of national party membership by sex
Southern European delegates are by far those with the longest party membership. 84\% of them are members of their parties for more than 10 years, as compared to $52 \%$ for those from Northern Europe, 60\% from Eastern Europe and 61\% from Western Europe.


Figure 23: Years of national party membership by sex
Most delegates are medium to high ranking party cadres. Rank and file (or grass-roots) members, i.e. members without any particular position in the party, represent only $15 \%$ of the Congress body.


Figure 24:Position in the national party
Figure 26 shows a slight differentiation from previous Congesses. Gender wasn't a distinguishing feature concerning the position in the party. However, according to the data of the present survey one can observe that men have a $30 \%$ percentage point lead over women in the "Member of highest bodies" group.


Figure 25: Position in the national party by sex
Only delegates from Northern Europe are equally distributed between the various categories. Southern Europe displays the most concentrated distribution with a vast majority of $86 \%$ of the delegates participating in higher and highest bodies of their national parties.


Figure 26: Position in the national party by region
The 18-24 age cohort is severely underrepresent in the congress as well as in our sample, thus the extreme polarizartion that in the most cases (for example Figure 28) is observed in this age group not to be considered.


Figure 27: Position in the national party by age group ${ }^{1}$


Figure 28: Employment relationship to the party or related organization
As one can notice in Figure 29, most delegates are not in employment relationship with their parties or associate organizations. This applies mainly to delegates from Eastern Europe, with $87 \%$ of them offering their services to the party on a voluntary basis, and less to delegates from Southern Europe, $36 \%$ of which are professional cadres, party staff or employees of associate organizations.


Figure 29: Employment relationship to the party or related organization by region

### 1.5 Participation in trade unions and social movements

Figure 31 shows that the very big majority of delegates participate or have participated in the past in trade unions (87\%), while the corresponding percentages for a number of social movements is rather low and in most cases never exceeding $50 \%$, with the exceptions of youth/student movement (81\%), Human Rights, Environmental group, Peace Movement and ESF.


Figure 30: Participation in trade unions and social movements

### 1.6 Placement on the Left-Right axis

As shown in Figure 34, the large majority of delegates place themselves on point 1,75 of the 1-10 Left-Right axis. Overall, delegates from Southern, Western and Eastern Europe place themselves on a more left position compared to the average (1,57, 1,59 and 1,63 ). On the other hand, delegates from Northern Europe appear as more "moderate" leftists, placing themselves at points 1,86 of the axis.


Figure 31: Self placement in the Left Right axis


Figure 32: Placement of national party in the Left RIght axis


Figure 33: Placement of EL in the Left Right axis


Figure 34: Selfplacement in the Left Right axis by region
Figure 35 shows the placement of national parties by the delegates of the $5^{\text {th }} \mathrm{EL}$ Congress. On average, delegates place their parties at point 2,1 on the Left-Right axis. There are no significant regional differences of opinions. An interesting finding is that delegates from Eastern Europe are the only ones which place their parties to the left of the average ( 1,85 as compared to 2,1 ).


Figure 35: Placement of national party in the Left RIght axis by region
As one can see in Figure 36, delegates place the EL at point 2,64 on the Left-Right axis. Delegates from Southern Europe place the EL well to the right of the average (at points 3,25), while Eastern and Northern delegates to the left of the average (at points 2,38 and 2,5 ).


[^0]
### 1.7 National and European identity

Adding the percentages of the middle three columns of Figure 37, one can observe that for the large majority of delegates ( $87 \%$ ) being "European" is an integral part of their identity. However, over half of them ( $52 \%$ ) consider that their national identity has a priority over their European one. The part of delegates who don't feel "Europeans" at all is small (14\%), while those who feel that they are "Europeans only" is even less (6\%).


Figure 37: Feeiling regarding National and European identity
Gender doesn't represent a stricking differentiation on the issue. However, less women feel "European only" than men ( $14 \%-28 \%$ correspondingly).


Figure 38: Feeiling regarding National and European identity by sex

Figure 39 shows that "Europeanism" in term of region reshape Europe into two new groups. Western and Southern Europe with small percentages in favor of national identity, and Northern and Eastern Europe where approximately 25\% of the delegates are perceiving themselves in term of their national identity.


Figure 39 : Feeiling regarding National and European identity by region
"Europeanism in a broad sense ("European only", "European and one's own nationality", "One's own nationality and European")" increases by age, reaching a 85\% in the 55-64 group, trend that moderates again in the 65+ age group (Figure 40).


Figure 40: Feeiling regarding National and European identity by age

## 2. VALUES OF THE DELEGATES

### 2.1 Attitude towards immigrants

A total of $68 \%$ believes that immigrants contribute to one's own country, in contrast to the previous survey, with a total of $80 \%$. Those who totally agree represent the $48,9 \%$ of the delegates, instead of $55 \%$ in the previous. Also, $12,8 \%$ of the delegates totally disagree, while only $3 \%$ of the delegates totally disagreed in the previous EL Congress. That could be related with the major refugee flows from the East towards Central Europe.


Figure 41: Agreement with the view that immigrants contribute a lot to one's own country
The differentiation in this attitude among delegates of various regions is still present and even more highlighted. The overwhelming majority of delegates from Western and Southern European parties appear to "totally agree" with the view that immigrants are beneficial to their countries ( $84,8 \%$ and $74,4 \%$ accordingly), while the percentage of delegates from Northern Europe who share this view is quite lower ( $33,3 \%$ ). As for the Eastern delegates, only $10 \%$ of them "totally agree". It should be noted that the percentages of the previous EL Congress are quite similar. However, there seem to be some differences concerning the percentages of delegates that "totally disagree" in comparison with the $4^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress. More specifically, only delegates from Eastern and Northern Europe seem to agree with this point of view ( $35 \%$ and $19 \%$ accordingly) in the $5^{\text {th }}$ EL Congress, while in the previous delegates who shared these beliefs were from Eastern and Western (9\% and 3\% accordingly).


Figure 42: Agreement with the view that immigrants contribute a lot to one's own country by region


Figure 43: Agreement with the view that immigrants contribute a lot to one's own country by age
The sum of delegates who either tend to agree or totally agree with the view that immigrants should retain their own customs seems to have slightly changed compared to the findings of the previous survey ( $80,7 \%$ from $86 \%$ ). The delegates who "totally agree" seem to have increased ( $45 \%$ from $39 \%$ ), while those who "tend to agree" have decreased ( $35,7 \%$ from 47\%). On the other hand, delegates who "tend to disagree" seem to have increased ( $12,1 \%$ from $6 \%$ ).


Figure 44: Agreement with the view that Immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs
Again, similar to the previous graph findings, delegates from Eastern Europe are the ones who "tend to disagree" with the highest percentage ( $32,5 \%$ ), and also they are the only ones who "totally disagree", with a high percentage of $15 \%$. Compared with the results from the previous EL, the percentages have mostly not remained stable. Delegates from Western Europe who "totally agree" have highly increased ( $60,6 \%$ from 33\%), from Eastern Europe they have highly decreased (15\% from 34\%), from Southern Europe they have greatly increased ( $64,3 \%$ from 44\%), and finally from Northern Europe they have slightly diminished (47,6\% from 53\%). The delegates who "tend to agree" are of the same percentage in all regions ( $33,3 \%$ in Western, Southern and Northern Europe, and $35 \%$ in Eastern Europe), and have all diminished from the previous EL Congress ( $48 \%, 53 \% 40 \%$ and $43 \%$ accordingly). The percentage of the delegates who "tend to disagree" has also highly increased in Eastern Europe ( $32,5 \%$ from $17 \%$ ). Finally, the percentage of eastern delegates who "totally disagree" has greatly increased ( $15 \%$ from $3 \%$ ).

Given the fact that the percentage of the 18-24 age group is not to be considered due to the severe underrepresentation of this age cohort in our sample, age does not represent an distinguishing feature on the issue.


Figure 45: Agreement with the view that immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs by region


Figure 46: Agreement with the view that immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs by age

### 2.2 Attitude towards distribution of asylum seekers

This section refers to two question that was included in the questionnaire for first time.
The majority of the delegate are in favor both of a better distribution of the number of asylum seekers and of distrubution on the basis of bindary quotas. However, there are some important regional differentiations that could be observed in Figures 48 and 50.


Figure 47: Agreement with the view that asylum seekers should be better distributed


Figure 48: Agreement with the view that asylum seekers should be better distributed by region


Figure 49: Agreement with the use of binding quotas for the distribution of asylum seekers


Figure 50: Agreement with the use of binding quotas for the distribution of asylum seekers by region
The most important differentiation comes from the Eastern European delegates, who are by far the most sceptic concerning the equal distribution of asylum seekers as well as with the idea of binding quotas.

### 2.3 Attitude towards economic policy

As far as the economic policy is concerned, the majority of the delegates agrees or tends to agree that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity. Also, the percentage of these who totally agree has increased in comparison to the past survey (from $18 \%$ to $26 \%$ ). The highest percentage of all delegates seem to tend to agree. Also the percentage of $23 \%$ who tended to disagree in the past seem to diminish ( $19 \%$ at the present survey) which can be explained by the results of economic crisis.


Figure 51: Agreement with the view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity
The view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity is very popular among delegates from Southern Europe ( $75 \%$ on the whole) and Eastern Europe ( $78 \%$ on the whole). However, people from Western and Northern Europe are the most critical against this view having $30 \%$ and $32 \%$ among their delegates who tend to disagree or totally disagree with the view expressed.


Figure 52: Agreement with the view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity by region
As far as the youngest age group is concerned, there cannot be produced any solid conclusion about it because of under-representation. On the other hand, the fact that the idea of central planning is very popular in a big variety of age groups, is obvious. The biggest part of the delegates seems to tend to agree, observing, also that older delegates ( $65+$ years old tend to agree in a very high percentage $72 \%$ ).


Figure 53: Agreement with the view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity
More than half of the delegates (63.6\%) totally disagree that economic growth must be a priority even if it affects the environment. Also $21.0 \%$ of the delegates tend to disagree with this view expressed; however, there is a surprising $6.3 \%$ that totally agrees.

Economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment


Figure 54: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment
Among the delegates, those who either totally agree or tend to agree with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affect the environment come mainly from Eastern Europe ( $40 \%$ of them). Also, $95 \%$ of the delegates from Western and Northern Europe totally disagree with this statement. The percentages from Eastern Europe could be understood in the spectra of the need for economic growth and development which is common in these regions.


Figure 55: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment by region

It's remarkable that all age groups totally disagree, in very high percentages, with the opinion that economic growth must be a priority even if that affects the environment, it could be possible to say that there is a special treatment and sensitivity when it comes to environmental issues. Younger delegates (25-34 years old and 35-44 years old)
constitute $74.1 \%$ and $76.5 \%$ accordingly. Oldest delegates totally disagree at percentages: $55-64 \%$ and $65+$ age groups totally disagree in $52.1 \%$ and $58.6 \%$ accordingly.


Figure 56: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment by age

Impresive is the acceptance of the view that major public services should be under public control. In fact the oposite view is not present in the body of the delegates.


Figure 57: Agreement with the view that major public services and industries ought to be publicly owned


Figure 58 Agreement with the view that major public services and industries ought to be publicly owned

### 2.4 Attitude towards violence

Graph 15 shows that most delegates ( $60 \%$ ) disagree in general with the view that violence can be justified as a legitimate means of social and political struggle ( $31 \%$ "totally disagree" and $29 \%$ "tend to disagree"). However, the number of delegates holding the opposite view is not insignificant ( $36 \%$ of the total).


Figure 59: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as a means of social and political struggle
Women delegates are less prone than men to support violence as a means of social and political struggle. $66 \%$ of them either disagree totally or tend to disagree, while the corresponding percentage for men delegates is $54 \%$ (Graph 15.3). This gender trend was also present in the previous surveys.


Figure 60: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as a means of social and political struggle by sex
However, as one can see (figure 61) answers are differentiated by regions as well, with a considerable part of delegates from the parties of Eastern and Southern Europe (42\% and $45 \%$ ) accepting or tending to accept violence as a legitimate means of social and political struggle. At the same time acceptance of violence among delegates from Western and Northern Europe records lower levels (27\% and 28\%).


Figure 61: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as a means of social and political struggle by region

### 2.5 Attitude towards same sex marriage, abortion, drug use

Delegates in the 3rd EL Congress seem to adopt "libertarian" values on issues such as cannabis consumption, abortion and same sex marriages. This trend is slightly moderated from the answers of Eastern European delegates, who seem to be more ambivalent on these issues. This regional differentiation was present in both previous surveys.


Figure 62: Agreement with the view that same-sex marriages should be allowed by law
As one can see, a very big majority of delegates (81\%) agree in general with the legalization of same sex marriages ( $76 \%$ "totally agree" and $5 \%$ "tend to agree").


Figure 63: Agreement with the view that same-sex marriages should be allowed by law by region
As shows Figure 64 the agreement with the view that woment should be free to decide on matter of abortion is absolute.


Figure 64: Agreement with the view that women should be free to decide on matter of abortion


Figure 65: Agreement with the view that women should be free to decide on matter of abortion by region


Figure 66:Agreement with the view that possesion of cannabis for personal use should be legalised

As one can see that $69 \%$ of them "totally agree" or "tend to agree" with the legalization of cannabis. No substantial differences appear between men and women delegates on this issue. Eastern European are more sceptic on the issue. This is not the case between delegates of younger and older age, where positive views range from $61 \%$ in the group of $64+$ yrs to $89 \%$ in the age group of $18-24$ yrs.


Figure 67: Agreement with the view that possesion of cannabis for personal use should be legalised by region



[^0]:    Figure 36: Placement of EL in the Left Right axis

