

# Questionnaire Survey 4<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Party of the European Left

held in Madrid on 12-15 December 2013

Data, profiles,  
personal values  
and views of the delegates



Nicos  
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European**LEFT**



# Questionnaire Survey 4th Congress of the Party of the European Left

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# EL SURVEY

This document does not represent the views of the party of the European Left, the interpretation of the results and the opinions expressed, belong solely to the author.

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## INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

The present survey on the Party of the European Left is based on the answers given to the questionnaires by the delegates on the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress of the party of the European Left, held in Madrid between 12 and 15 December 2013. The survey is part of the ongoing, since 2009, “Left Strategy” project, one of the core-projects of Transform! Europe Network. It is the second Survey after the one published in 2013, and thus provide on the one hand, the statistical and analytical tools and framework addressing issues useful for the understanding of the so called “radical” or “transformative” Left, the party of the European Left and needed for the elaboration of their policies; and on the other, how to hinder the transformations taken place and the trends on the views and the profiles of the delegates of the congresses through a brief comparison with the results of the previous survey. To that end, the questionnaire elaborated made an effort to enlarge the aspects of the views of the delegates adding new questions, keeping at the same time all the core questions in order to clarify trends and transformations. The presentation of the answers tries to keep the same intuition with the former one, thus keeping the same division of questions and the same order. The results and the comparison brought forward will hopefully provide an analytical and methodological base to encourage and promote the follow up of the process towards wider trends and comparisons.

The text is divided in four sections in the same manner with the previous one:

1. Profile of the delegates
2. Values of the delegates
3. Views of the delegates on various issues
4. Evaluation of the party of the European Left by the delegates and policy suggestions

All technical specifications of the Survey (sampling method, sample size, regional classification of the delegates’ parties, questionnaire) may be found in the Appendix of the Survey.

The main analytical classification tools were: a) age, b) sex and c) regional profile of the delegates. These analytical tools have proven themselves to be explicit and eloquent in the sense that they have “revealed significant differences in the delegates’ answers” (Questionnaire Survey on the European Left 2013, p. 4). Also, the recognition of changes in the classified samples provides deep knowledge on the trends and the advisable, according to the delegates, political strategy. Again, regional differences are found to be the most significant.

The reading of all the survey is advisable to realize the exact trends and transformations, however a brief summary of the most important results is held.

### A. *Profile of the Delegates*

Delegates of the congress are on average aged over 45 years old, although people between 35 and 44 are found to be more in comparison to the former Survey at the expense of younger delegates. They have undertaken post-graduate studies and

compared to the former Survey they are more educated. Furthermore, they are mainly high rank members and officials of the parties depicting a shift towards more strategic character of the Congresses. Thus, most members are participating for more than 10 years in the party's life. At the same time, earnings of the delegates seem to be higher, compared to the last survey and are clustered between 20.000 euro and 50.000 euro, albeit, men earn more than women among the participants.

In line with previous findings, most married delegates with children are men, giving evidence for the difficulties of the women in combining party life with childbirth and work, which is also evident from the difference in the earning and in the ranks in the parties' bodies.

### *B. Values of delegates*

In line with the previous findings, delegates are generally speaking adopting libertarian views and share the values of the left. They appreciate the cohabitation of natives and immigrants, and they do not generally accept violence as legitimate mean of social and political struggle. Furthermore, they appreciate the role of social movements and they perceive them as allies in the process of social transformation. At the same time, they largely adopt the values of social movements which coincide with libertarian values such as the woman's right to abortion, the legalization of the consumption of cannabis and same sex marriages. Next, they ask for central planning in the sense that they believe it as the best guarantee to prosperity. Also, they seem to be hostile to productionism since they fairly disagree with the view that economic growth must be a priority even if it affects the environment. When coming to obedience to authority they tend to disagree with the view, though far from unanimously. Finally, they believe their societies being rather not religious.

### *C. Views of delegates on various issues*

The future of Europe, in terms of the overcome of the crisis seems to be darker for the majority of the delegates compared to the former survey making a total of 88% who believe that the worst is still to come concerning the crisis in the EU. Though, the most optimistic age group, concerning the ongoing crisis, is the one between 45 and 54 years old. Furthermore, the views of their parties or themselves seem to have changed towards more euro-skeptic views, possibly due to the ongoing crisis. Thus, the exit from the Euro-zone seems plausible to a greater part of the delegates. In the same spirit, people find themselves harmed from the formation of the EU to a larger extent than in the past. Also, delegates suggesting exit from the EU have increased compared to the former survey, though remaining less than those proposing exit from the euro-zone as expected.

They consider themselves as more left-wing than their parties especially concerning the party of the EL, though differences seem to be rather mitigated compared to the former survey. At the same time, more people find social transformation feasible only in

an international level, e.g. Europe. The party of the EL seems more left-wing than their own parties for the delegates coming from Eastern Europe.

Delegates are not satisfied with the way democracy functions in their countries, making these views close to be unanimous. They seem to have similar views towards the social movements as far as their impact on their parties' strategy and policy with the slight exception of people coming from Eastern Europe (same as the former survey).

#### *D. Evaluation of the European Left by delegates*

In line with the findings of the previous survey, though with insignificant differentiations, the body of delegates regards the politics of the EL as "anticapitalist", "alternative" and "transformative". Delegates believe that the EL has a clear political perspective and policy implementations on most policy issues, however when focusing on the answers there seems a lack of information which is also testified when asked for the impact of the European Left on the European politics discourse, which is found to be rather not strong. Also, the low turnout of the European elections is foreseen when answering on evaluating societies' interest on the elections (47%), while the interest on the elections is unanimous when expressing own views regarding the interest on the elections. The issues that will determine the votes in the European elections are said to be mainly national issues according to the body of the delegates. Finally, concerning the evaluation of the EL party in 2009 elections most people mention it as helpful.

The impact of the EL party in the political life and strategy of the nationals' parties has increased significantly, though remaining not that strong. The agenda of political actions and perspectives issued by the EL are mainly focused on the topics of crisis, unemployment, environment, social welfare and migration. The most effective political activities are witnessed among the delegates to be dialogue either with social movements or trade unions, campaigns and communication via social networks. The discussion on the debt seems to be the most intriguing for the delegates of the EL Congress, seeming to monopolize the discussion of the left, bringing the majority of the delegates to ask for a cancelation of a part of the debt as the primary solution of the Euro-zone's periphery debt crisis and the debt auditing the second most plausible solution for the debt crisis.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**


We would like to express our sincere thanks to:

- the EL executive board and the EL member parties for the translation of the questionnaires to various languages
- the chairpersons of the Congress for their continuous reminders to delegates to fill the questionnaire.


## 1. PROFILE OF THE DELEGATES

### 1.1 Age, marital and parental status

A process of ageing of the delegates takes place when comparing the age status of the delegates of the 3<sup>rd</sup> EL congress, held in Paris (2010) and the one under discussion (4<sup>th</sup> congress Madrid 2013). The younger groups of delegates (18-24 and 25-34) are greatly diminished (4% from 7% and 8% from 17% accordingly), when all other age groups have increased in terms of participants; people more than 45 years old sum up to 69% from 62% in the former (see Graph 1, 1a).




Graph 1: Age, 4<sup>th</sup> EL Congress




Graph 1a: Age 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress 2010 Paris 1<sup>st</sup> survey

Along with the ageing process of the delegates, the percentage of those being married or in a civil partnership has significantly increased (60% from 50%), probably in connection with the increased average age of the delegates (see Graph 2).




Graph 2: Marital Status

Furthermore, in line with the findings of the previous survey, married or in a civil partnership males are more than females in the same marital status, (67% to 52%), though the distinction seems greatly mitigated (61% to 39% accordingly in the previous survey), meaning that the increase in the number of married and in civil partnership delegates is due to the greater increase of married and in a civil partnership women. Also, divorced women though remaining numerous seem to be decreased (15% from 18%) same for men (3% from 7%), whereas separated are only men, depicting the 6% of their whole population (see Graph 2.1).




Graph 2.1: Marital Status by sex

The change in the marital status of the delegates is not depicted in their parental status; compared to the former survey (61% from 60%), thus the fact that the majority of delegates has children remains (see Graph 3).



Graph 3: Parental Status

The slight increase in the number of parents among the delegates is exclusively due to the increased number of women having children (53% from 50%), thus mitigating the previous finding of the disadvantageous position of women when involved in politics, and accompanying maternal, political and work duties (see Graph 3.1).




Graph 3.1: Parental Status by sex

## 1.2 Education and Internet use


Delegates of the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress are highly educated; 83% of them having at least university degree and 59% having accomplished post-graduate studies. Compared to the sketch of the previous survey an ongoing process of obtaining higher education is taking place, since people having accomplished post-graduate studies have almost doubled in the current survey compared to the former one (59% from 30%). Thus, the body of the delegates is closer to the formation of a new highly educated working class, having very poor participation of people having technical and secondary degrees, who often happen to fall closer into the traditional working class (see Graph 4).





Graph 4: Education


The distribution of the different degrees of education is more or less similar to the different regions of Europe. However, people having attained a PhD are numerous in the Eastern part of Europe including Turkey (26%) and in Southern Europe (14%), though to a lesser extent. At the same time, 60% of the delegates coming from Northern Europe retain a Master’s degree. Also, the most people having vocational/technical education come from Southern Europe; delineating a considerable gap between highly and poorly educated people (see Graph 4.1).



Graph 4.1: Education by region


English is the most commonly spoken language given that approximately 90% of the delegates can communicate in English; among them 34% speak fluently (from 23% fluently speaking in the previous congress). This finding is in line with the higher education of the delegates mentioned in the afore-mentioned graph. The less spoken language is Russian, given that 30% of the delegates do not speak at all. Also, the next more spoken languages in a fluent way are German and French (28% and 25% accordingly). On the

whole, delegates are more “people of the world” compared to the ones of the previous congress, being able to communicate in various languages in a more fluent way (see Graph 5).




Graph 5: Spoken Languages

As seen in the graph 5.1 English language is spoken most fluently in Western Europe and to a significantly lesser extent in Southern and Northern Europe. In the Eastern part of Europe including Turkey, the English language is to a very small extent spoken fluently, the same in force for all other languages except for the Russian language. Also, German language is spoken fluently by delegates, who almost all come from Western Europe (74%). Almost all the fluent French speakers come from Western and Southern Europe (80% on the whole). Also, most of the delegates from Southern Europe are able to communicate in Spanish. Finally, delegates from Southern Europe speak less, among the languages spoken, the German. The findings are in general terms similar to the ones of the previous survey, despite the fact that all languages are more adequately spoken by the delegates irrespectively of the parts of Europe, with the slight exception of Eastern Europe and Turkey, where differences seem to be less significant.




Graph 5.1: Spoken Languages by region

Following the results of the previous survey, we come across of approximately the same use of the internet in terms of frequency and place (Graphs 6 and 7).




Graph 6: Use of the Internet



Graph 7: Frequency of the Internet use


### 1.3 Occupation and Income

Compared to the previous survey unemployed people though increased (7% from 4%) are still underrepresented in the Congress of a left party, taking into account the ongoing increase in the unemployment the three years that intervene between the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress of the EL. Also, self employed have increased (13% from 7%), at the expense of diminished wage earners (54% from 56%). The opposite is in force for people still in school or studying (4% from 8%) and for retired people (13% from 16%) (see Graph 8).




Graph 8: Current occupation

Full time employed distribute evenly among the parts of Europe. Unemployed people come mainly from Southern and Northern Europe (24% and 29% respectively), whereas self-employed come mainly from Eastern Europe and Turkey and Western Europe (6% and 4% respectively). Most people in school or still studying come from Northern Europe (14%) underlining the age of the Northern European delegates, something mentioned also in foregoing questions (see Graph 8.1).




Graph 8.1: Current occupation by region

Among the part of the delegates being workers most people are working for the state, 44% on the whole, 38% in the public services and 6% in the state industry, whereas 30% of the delegates are working for the private sector 17% in the services and 13% in the industry. People working in the agricultural sector are very few (see Graph 9).




Graph 9: Workplace

Among the delegates from Southern Europe most people are working in public services (51% of all the delegates from SE) higher than the percentage of people working in public services in the rest of Europe (around 40%). Most people working in the private services come from Western Europe (20%) and most people working in the private industry come from Eastern Europe and Turkey (16%). Workers in the state industry exist solely in Southern Europe and in Eastern Europe and Turkey (see Graph 9.1).




Graph 9.1: Workplace by region

More than half of the working force of the delegates is working as professional and technical labour (52%), whereas only 15% work as clerical and 12% work as higher administrative work-force. Semi-skilled work force represent only the 2% of the labour-force whereas skilled workers represent the 6% and sales people the 4% of the labour. Taking these findings into account we confess a labour force that does not fall into the traditional labour force, albeit falls closer to what is called new educated labour class, as already mentioned in graph 4 (see Graph 10).



Graph 10: Labour Division


The image is slightly different when turning on the sexual dimension of the division of labour. Only men are working as skilled workers, whereas more women are working in services and professional and technical workplaces (see Graph 10.1).



Graph 10.1: Labour division by sex




Delegates of the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress seem to be richer than those of the previous Congress. Their annual household incomes are distributed in a more typical way moving around the two middle income classes, i.e. from 20.001 to 30.000 and from 30.0001 to 50.000 (both 21% of the population). People falling into lower incomes i.e. from 1001 to 5000; from 5.001 to 10.000 and from 10.001 to 20.000 have diminished compared to the former survey (8% from 14%; 11% from 12% and 14% from 18% accordingly). Albeit, the income category of the very poor household incomes, incomes up to 1000 euro annually has increased (6% from 4%), providing evidence for sharper class distinctions between the delegates of the Congress (see Graph 11).



Graph 11: Annual Income


Graph 11.1 provides a very eloquent image of the class distinction among European peripheries. All delegates from Eastern Europe have annual household incomes less than 70.000 euro whereas half of them earn less than 10.000 euro per year, counted as households. Also, more than one out of ten earns less than 1000 euro per year (14%). On the other hand, the richer delegates, as expected are those coming from Western and Northern Europe, whereas delegates from Southern Europe are concentrated around the categories of the middle incomes.



Graph 11.1: Annual Income by region


#### 1.4 Years of national party membership, position in the national party

The vast majority of delegates have been party members for more than 10 years (64%); same as the former survey. Though members between 3 to 5 years and 5 to 10 years in the party's life have increased compared to the former survey (18% from 12% and 9% from 8% accordingly) against the decreased number of newcomers in the party's life. This finding is in accordance to the findings of the age, the incomes and the party status of the delegates (see Graph 12).




Graph 12: Years of national party membership

Women delegates are overrepresented in all categories except for the category of the membership of more than 10 years in the party’s life. This finding may be appreciated as a growing trend of new entries of women in the party’s life (see Graph 12.1).




Graph 12.1: Years of national party membership by sex

Unlike the findings of the previous survey where Southern Europe's delegates were the most numerous in the classification of the older in the party's life members, in the Madrid Congress the higher percentage of older members in the party's life come from Western Europe. Also, less than one year in the party's life are only people coming from Northern Europe (13% of the whole population of delegates coming from Northern Europe), but also in the categories "between 3 and 5 years" in the party's life most people are to be found from Eastern Europe and Turkey and Northern Europe, 31% and 27% respectively (see Graph 12.2).




Graph 12.2: Years of national party membership by region

Almost half of the delegates belong to the highest bodies of the party (45%) and have significantly increased compared to the 30% of the delegates of the previous survey. At the same time, grassroots members are fewer 17% from 25% in the previous one, though remaining a significant part of the body of delegates. On the whole 71% of the delegates belong to the either higher or highest bodies of the national parties. The above findings may be understood as a process of transforming the framework, intuition and scope of the EL Congresses in general (see Graph 13).




Graph 13: Position in the national party

In accordance with previous findings women are found to be underrepresented in terms of their position in the highest body of the party. Furthermore, this kind of sexual bias between the delegates seems to significantly deepen; 48% men to 40% women in the highest bodies from 37% men to 34% women in the previous. The disadvantageous position of women when involving in politics, and accompanying maternal, political and work duties mentioned previously is highlighted in the light of this finding, meaning that the problematic is still existent and the EL should focus on gender equality referring to equal participation in highest bodies of the parties. On the other hand, in all other categories women are more in comparison to men (see Graph 13.1).




Graph 13.1: Position in the national party by sex

Worth to mention the fact that members in the highest bodies are people aged between 45 and 64 years old; 56% of them belonging to the highest bodies. Also, the majority of the people aged between 35 and 44 are to be found in the highest bodies of the delegates (39%). Furthermore, delegates aged between 25 and 34 are evenly distributed between all the bodies of the national parties. Most grassroots members come from the ages between 25 and 34 and 35 to 44, 30% each. Finally, people aged between 18 and 24 are mostly members of the intermediate bodies of their parties or youth organizations and in the rest categories they are evenly distributed, 20% in each of the other categories (see Graph 13.2).




Graph 13.2: Position in the national party by age

Most grassroots members as a percentage of the population of delegates comes from Northern Europe, a finding which may be in accordance with the new comers found in the parties of Northern Europe. Furthermore, the vast majority of the delegates coming from Eastern Europe participate in the highest bodies (70%), whereas people from Southern Europe sum up to 58% participating in the higher and highest bodies of their parties (see Graph 13.3).



Graph 13.3: Position in the national party by region


As one can notice in Graph 14 most delegates are not in a paid relationship with their party. Furthermore, the number of delegates in a paid relationship with the party or organization has greatly decreased compared to the previous survey (15% from 26%), irrespectively of the fact that among the delegates those who participate in the highest bodies of their parties have greatly increased (see Graph 14).



Graph 14: Employment relationship

The percentage of delegates being in a paid relationship with the party or the organization they belong is to be found in Southern Europe (25%), whereas only 3% of the delegates coming from Eastern Europe and Turkey are being in a paid relationship with their party or organization (see Graph 14.1).






Graph 14.1: Employment relationship by region


### 1.5 Participation in trade unions and social movements

Slightly decreased from the findings of the previous survey, half of the delegates participates currently in a trade union (51%), and 74% of the delegates are participating or have participated in the past in trade unions (80% in the previous survey). Furthermore, those who have participated or are participating in a youth organization are more than half of the delegates (57%). In the same spirit, participation in an environmental group (31% from 29%), a feminist organization (28% from 22%), or an organization of human rights (37% from 32%) has increased highlighting a shift towards a more active participation in the so called “social movements” among the delegates in the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress, despite the fact that the body of them is transformed in a body of higher and highest members of their parties (see Graph 15).




Graph 15: Participation in trade-unions and social movements

The transformation of the EL political actor in terms of views and intuition is also highlighted in the findings of the Graph 16, where instead of the traditional Marxist view that the traditional working class is the agent of social transformation (7%), the unemployed and the immigrants are seen as transformative political actors (14% each), whereas women, youth and precarious are seen in a more plausible way as possible agents of social transformation (13%, 12% and 12% accordingly). This transformation is not unrelated with the changes taking place in the political actors of the left in Europe and the emergence of SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain (see Graph 16).




Graph 16: Agents of social transformation

Despite the fact that new political actors have emerged and the view on the agents of social transformation have changed, focusing on unemployed and immigrants, when turning on the agents of political transformation trade unions reemerge as the most commonly viewed agent (19%). At the same time, citizen's initiatives closely related to the Podemos' political methodology are seen as a plausible actor of political transformation (18%), whereas political movements and political parties do not gather many votes concerning their feasibility of political transformation, 14% and 10% respectively (see Graph 17).



Graph 17: Agents of political transformation

As seen in Graph 18 most delegates have not participated in previous conferences (29%) and then most delegates have participated in Athens (19%) and Prague (19%), Paris (18%) and Rome (15%).




Graph 18: Participation as delegate in the previous conferences

## 2. VALUES OF THE DELEGATES


### 2.1 *Attitude towards immigrants*

A total of 80% believes that immigrants contribute a lot to one's own country (84% in the previous survey). Those who totally agree represent the 55% of the delegates, instead of 59% in the previous. The view "totally disagree" now expressed by 3% of the delegates was not at all expressed in the previous survey (see Graph 19).




Graph 19: Agreement with the view that immigrants contribute a lot to one's own country

The differentiation existing in the previous survey between the regions on the agreement with the view that immigrants contribute in one's own country is still existent and even more highlighted. The view "tend to disagree", is expressed only by people from Eastern Europe and Turkey (40%), though in the previous survey the percentage was note that high (28%). Also, the view expressed "totally disagree" is expressed by a rather high 9% of delegates coming from Eastern Europe and Turkey and by the 3% of delegates coming from Western Europe. Finally, all delegates from Southern Europe either agree (72%) or tend to agree (28%) with the view that immigrants contribute in a country (see Graph 19.1).




Graph 19.1: Agreement with the view that immigrants contribute a lot to one’s own country by region

The sum of delegates who either tend to agree or totally agree with the view that immigrants should retain their own customs remains rather unchanged compared to the findings of the previous survey (86% from 84%), although the internal distribution of the whole has changed rather significantly. Those who totally agree represent 39% instead of 45% and those who tend to agree the 47% from 39%. Also, delegates that totally disagree are found for the first time, in the current survey (see Graph 20).



Graph 20: Agreement with the view that immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs


Again, as in the previous graph (19.1) findings delegates from Eastern Europe are the ones who tend to disagree with the higher percentage (17% of them). Also, 97% of the people of Southern Europe either totally agree or tend to agree with the view that immigrants should retain their own customs (see Graph 20.1).



Graph 20.1: Agreement with the view that immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs by region


## 2.2 Attitude towards economic policy

A rather very large part of the delegates tends to agree or totally agrees with the view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity (77%). Needless to say, that in an era when views regarding the third-sector, the self-organization of enterprises the increased interest on commons and on peer to peer production the above percentage is highly surprising. On the other hand those who either tend to disagree or totally disagree are rather few (25%). However, it is important to say that most views seem to be rather mitigated, with the views that “tend to agree” or “tend to disagree”, summing up to 78% of the body of delegates (see Graph 21).



Graph 21: Agreement with the view that the best guarantee for economic prosperity is central planning


The view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity is very popular among delegates from Southern Europe (86% on the whole) and Eastern Europe (77% on the whole). However, people from Western Europe are the most critical against this view having 38% among their delegates who tend to disagree or totally disagree with the view expressed (see Graph 21.1).



Graph 21.1: Agreement with the view that the best guarantee for economic prosperity is central planning by region




Turning on the ages there is another surprising result, 80% of the people aged between 18 and 24 tend to agree with the view that central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity. Also, among the delegates aged between 25 and 34 there is no one disagreeing with the afore-mentioned view, despite the fact that 30% of them do not know. Finally, the disagreement to the view is most popular for those aged more than 45 years old; 25% for those aged between 45 and 54, same for those aged between 55 and 64 and 28% for those aged more than 65 years old. Those who totally disagree are aged between 45 and 54 and represent the 7% of their whole population (see Graph 21.2).




Graph 21.2: Agreement with the view that the best guarantee for economic prosperity is

More than half of the delegates (54%) totally disagree that economic growth must be a priority even if it affects the environment. Also 28% of the delegates tend to disagree with this view expressed; however, there is a surprising 19% that either tends to agree or agrees with the view, among them 7% totally agrees (see Graph 22).




Graph 22: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment

Among the delegates, those who either totally agree or tend to agree with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affect the environment come either from Eastern Europe and Turkey (35% of them) or from Southern Europe (8% of them). Also, 95% of the legates from Northern Europe totally disagree with the afore-mentioned view. The above result may be understood in the spectra of either economic crisis and the need for economic growth, common in these regions, or to the traditional Marxist milieu in terms of economic growth and development, which tends to be productionist (see Graph 22.1).




Graph 22.1: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment by region

Focusing on the level of agreement to the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment, in terms of age division one could come up with interesting results. The vast majority (84%) of those aged between 18 and 24 totally disagree with the view expressed, making the tension to disagreement and the complete disagreement unanimous among this age group. Also, 88% of those aged between 18 and 24 tend or disagree with that view, while the rest of them answer “don’t know”, meaning that no one in that age group totally agrees with the view. This finding could be encompassed through the view that younger people from the left have not had theoretical or methodological affinities with the traditional productionist view mainly expressed in the USSR. Among those aged from 35 to 44, 4% totally agrees with the view, while the same in force for the 3% of the people aged between 55 and 64. Another interesting finding is that no one aged more than 65 expresses his/her total agreement to the view (see Graph 22.2).




Graph 22.2: Agreement with the view that economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment by age

Almost unanimous seems the agreement to the view expressed that public services and industries ought to be publicly owned. 85% of them totally agree, while 11% of them tend to agree.




### 2.3 Attitude towards violence

More than half of the delegates tend to disagree or totally disagree with the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle (60%), rather significantly decreased (67% in the former survey). This decrease is mainly due to the decrease in the number of those who totally disagree (25% from 31%). The decrease in the number is transmitted towards an increase in the number of those who tend to agree (27% from 21%). This trend should not be unrelated with the process towards more authoritarian statism taking place in Europe (see Graph 24).




Graph 24: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle

When focusing on the sexual dimension of the agreement to the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle we come across the finding that in general women are more radical than men scoring 42% in the either total agreement or total disagreement with the view, while men score 30% (12% total agreement and 30% total disagreement while 8% and 22% for women and men accordingly).




Graph 24.1: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle by sex

The regional dimension towards the agreement to the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle is also informative. Almost half of the delegates coming from Western Europe either tend to agree or totally agree with this view (46%) while 48% are on the opposite side. Also, 40% of the delegates coming from Northern Europe either agree or tend to agree with the view. On the whole, people from Eastern Europe and Turkey seem to be the most pacifists among delegates, while Southern Europeans also generally disagree with violence despite the fact that authoritarian statism is more evident in the states of Southern Europe (see Graph 24.2).



Graph 24.2: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle by region


The age dimension towards the agreement to the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle is also informative. The agreement and the tension to agreement are unanimous among young delegates (18-24 years old). Also, the most hostile to violence age group is the older one (more than 65 years old) and then the age group between 45 and 54 and 55 to 64 years old, 65% and 63% respectively (see Graph 24.3).



Graph 24.3: Agreement with the view that violence can be justified as means of social and political struggle by age

## 2.4 Attitude towards same sex marriage, abortion, drug use


The vast majority of delegates agree with the view that same sex marriage should be allowed by law (81% from 84% in the former survey). The percentage of people totally disagreeing has increased significantly 12% from 4% in the former survey (see Graph 25).



Graph 25: Agreement with the view that same sex marriage should be allowed by law


The view that women should be free to decide on matters of abortion is almost unanimous (97%) from 96% in the former survey (see Graph 26).






Graph 26: Agreement with the view that women should be free to decide on matters of abortion

No significant changes are to be mentioned in the issue of the legalization of personal consumption of cannabis as well, maintaining the libertarian profile of delegates sketched in the previous survey. The number of people who agree or tend to agree with the legalization of the consumption of cannabis has slightly increased; 72% from 69% in the former survey (see Graph 27).




Graph 27: Agreement with the view that consumption of cannabis should be legalized

A surprisingly high percentage of delegates coming from Eastern and Turkey totally disagree with the legalization of personal consumption of cannabis (46%), summing to 69% when adding the tension to disagreement. On the opposite 90% of delegates coming from Western Europe and 95% of those from Southern Europe either totally agree or tend to agree with the legalization; 65% total agreement-25% tension to agreement to 42% and 53% for Western Europe and Southern Europe respectively (see Graph 27.1)



Graph 27.1: Agreement with the view that consumption of cannabis should be legalized by region


The most libertarian group age as seen previously is the one between 18 and 24, where the agreement with the legalization is unanimous. The age groups that seem to be more hostile towards the legalization are the one formed by those more than 65 years old (34%, 28% totally disagreeing) and the one from 55 to 64 (38%, 15% totally disagree). All other age groups gather around 70% in the views supporting the legalization (see Graph 27.2).



Graph 27.2: Agreement with the view that consumption of cannabis should be legalized by age


## 2.4 Attitude towards obedience to the authority of children

The libertarian and democratic profile of the delegates is partially set aside when expressing views on the need of children's obedience to authority. A surprisingly high percentage of 30%, of the delegates agrees to the obedience of children to authority while 66% of them confirming on the opposite. Among them, 37% totally disagreeing with the view expressed (see Graph 28).




Graph 28: Agreement with the view that schools must teach children to obey authority

Following previous results and affirming the regional distinction of delegate in terms of ideology and values, we come across a rather very high 87% of the delegates agreeing or tending to agree with the view that supports obedience of young children to authority. On the other hand, the regions where disobedience of children to authority is plausible to delegates is Southern Europe (89%), and Western and Northern Europe, 80% each (see Graph 28.1).




Graph 28.1: Agreement with the view that schools must teach children to obey authority by region

A surprisingly high percentage of 20%, among the younger delegates (18-24 years old), totally agrees with the obedience of children to authority. On the whole, either agreeing or tending to agree age groups perform in a rather even way, 30% of the age group 25-34 agree, 36%, 35% and 28% for the age groups 45-54, 55-64, and more than 65 years old accordingly (see Graph 28.2).



Graph 28.2: Agreement with the view that schools must teach children to obey authority by age


The radical thought and values drawn in the banks of sexual division is also confirmed, having women totally disagreeing or agreeing on the 59%, whereas men score a comparatively low 39%. On the other hand, in the answers that move around a median tension men are much more popular (see Graph 28.3).



Graph 28.3: Agreement with the view that schools must teach children to obey authority by sex


### 2.5 Attitude towards religion

The answers in the question of acknowledgement of the religiousness in one's own country are rather a means of evaluation of the society by the delegates. 60% of the delegates do not think or tending not to think that the countries they leave into are religious, while 37% of them think that their countries could be described as tending to be or being religious (see Graph 29).




Graph 29: Agreement with the view that religion in one's own country is very important

The majority of people appreciating their countries as rather religious or very religious come from Southern Europe; 59% of them agree or tend to agree to the statement that religion in the country is very important and 33% of people coming from Western Europe. People coming from Eastern Europe and Turkey and Northern Europe perceive their countries as not very religious or not religious, 77% and 67% respectively (see Graph 29.1).



Graph 29.1: Agreement with the view that religion in one’s own country is very important by region

Younger classes of delegates tend to believe more, compared to other age groups of delegates, that their societies are or tend to be very religious; 40% of those aged between 18 and 24 and 30% of those aged between 25 and 34 and 54% of those aged between 35 and 44. The age group that perceives their societies as tending to be less religious or not religious are the more aged groups 55-64 years old and those aged more than 65, 68% and 67% accordingly (see Graph 29.2).




Graph 29.2: Agreement with the view that religion in one’s own country is very important by age



### 3. VIEWS OF THE DELEGATES ON VARIOUS ISSUES


#### 3.1 *Economic crisis and its impact on national parties' attitude towards the EU*

The vast majority of the delegates believe that the crisis is still pending. Five years have passed from the outburst of the crisis in 2008 intervening between the answers of the delegates and the outcome and the duration of the crisis is still to be acknowledged though in a pessimistic framework. The amount of delegates believing this has increased, from the former survey driven in 2010, even though insignificantly, 87% from 86% (see Graph 30).




Graph 30: Perception of the outcomes and duration of the economic crisis

According to the Eurobarometer the perception of European citizens is the gradual overcome of the economic crisis, having in September 2014 for the first time a reverse in the numbers of those believing that the crisis has reached its peak in terms of its effects on jobs and employment and those who believe that the worst is still to come. According to this trend there is a clear divergence between the delegates of the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress still on December 2013 though and the perception of European citizens according to the Eurobarometer (see Graph 30.1).




Graph 30.1: Impact of crisis on jobs, Eurobarometer 2014 “Public Opinion in the European Union”

The most pessimistic region of Europe regarding the outcomes and the duration of the crisis is Southern Europe, where 97% of its delegates answer “the worst is still to come”, 100% in the previous survey. Also, delegates from Northern Europe have become more pessimistic regarding the crisis since 87% of them (67% in the former survey). The surprising result is that 23% of those coming from Eastern Europe and Turkey believe that the crisis has reached its peak, 16% in the former survey (see Graph 30.2).



Graph 30.2: Perception of the outcomes and duration of the economic crisis by region


The Eurobarometer provides a country-specific analysis of the trends on the opinions on the duration and outcomes of the economic crisis. French, Cypriot, Greek Portuguese are witnessed as being among the most pessimistic regarding the crisis.



Graph 30.3: Impact of crisis on jobs by country, Eurobarometer 2014 “Public Opinion in the European Union”


The magnitude and severity of the crisis and the perception that there are worse to come regarding the crisis seem to have influenced in a more deep way the attitudes of

the national parties towards the EU. More precisely, 46% witness an influence on the national party towards the EU due to the crisis, posing a significant increase from the 37% of the delegates in the former survey (see Graph 31).



Graph 31: Perception of the influence of the crisis on one's national party


The most influenced region in terms of answers of their delegates is Southern Europe, where the delegates answer at a significant 65% (42% in the former) that the view towards the EU has changed significantly as an outcome of the crisis while delegates from Northern Europe do not mention a significant change towards the EU in their political parties due to the crisis. Also, significant is the change in the number of delegates coming from Western Europe finding changes in the national parties' attitude towards the EU, due to the crisis, 54% from 18% in the former survey (see Graph 31.1).



Graph 31.1: Perception of the influence of the crisis on one's national party by region


### 3.2 National parties and social movements

The view that social movements and national parties either tend to be allies or are definitely allies is almost unanimous (99%). In fact, two thirds of the delegates believe that they are in a definite alliance, while the percentage was 62% in the former survey (see Graph 32).




Graph 32: Views on the relationship between social movements and national parties

As shown in Graph 33 social movements are not only an ally of the national parties but also they influence national parties. 83% of the delegates believe that the influence is either great or to some extent; 39% and 44% accordingly from 32% and 50% posing a shift towards a more clear output of the relationship between social movements and national parties (see Graph 33).



Graph 33: Views on the influence of social movements on national parties

The greater influence of social movements on national parties is to be testified in the countries of Southern Europe (97%, of whom 64% mention a great influence). Needless to say, that this finding should be related with the strong presence of social movements in this part of Europe, and the framework, structure and policy of their parties (SYRIZA, Podemos, Lista Tsipras). Parties from Eastern Europe and Turkey seem to be the less affected, since 35% of the delegates mention little or no influence to the national parties from the social movements, possibly because of the weak presence and activity in this part of Europe (see Graph 33.1).




Graph 34: Views on the influence of social movements on national parties by region




### 3.3 Placement on the Left-Right Axis

On the whole, a movement towards more left positions is testified among the delegates either in terms of self-position, perception of national parties and perception of the politics of the European Left. To begin with, 50% of the delegates perceive themselves in the most left side of the axis (1); 31% on the selection 2 and 17% on the selection 3 of the left-right axis. On average the self placement is calculated at 1,7 from 1,8 in the previous survey (see Graph 34).




Graph 34: Self-Placement on the left-right axis

The most eloquent replacement is the one from the delegates coming from Western Europe averaging 1,48 from 1,77 in the previous survey and the one from delegates coming from Northern Europe 1,40 from 2,04 in the previous survey (see Graph 34.1).




Graph 34.1: Average self-placement on the left-right axis by region

In the same spirit, there is slight replacement in the perception of the left politics of the national parties. The significance of left politics averages at 2,05 from 2,1. Also, those who answer that their political parties are placed in the most left position of the axis represent the 36% of the delegates (see Graph 35).




Graph 35: Placement on the left-right axis of one's own national party

Again, the most significant replacements are to be found among the delegates coming from Western and Northern Europe calculating an average of 1,9 and 1,93 respectively from 2,2 and 2,16 in the former survey. Furthermore, delegates from Eastern Europe see their parties being more "right-wing" from the former survey, averaging 2,29 from 2,18 (see Graph 35.1).




Graph 35.1: Average placement on the left-right axis of one's own national party by region

The most significant replacement though is to be found on the perception of left-wing politics of the EL averaging from 2,9 in the former survey 2,6. There are a significant 17% of the delegates that see the politics of the EL in the position 1, i.e. the most left position in the left-right axis. The majority of the delegates (34%) places the politics of the EL on the position 3 of the left-right axis (see Graph 36).



Graph 36: Placement on the left-right axis of the EL party


Delegates from Western Europe reevaluate the left-wing politics of the EL party averaging 2,33 from 3,38 in the former survey and delegates from Southern Europe averaging 2,92 from 3,27, possibly because they see the EL in the last elections more closely related to their parties (see Graph 36.1).



Graph 36.1: Average placement on the left-right axis of the EL party by region


### 3.4 National and European identity

Among the delegates, the majority of them perceive him/herself having the European identity as complementary to the own national identity (80%). The majority of them perceives him/herself firstly with his/her own nationality firstly and complementarily the European Identity (60%). The perception of solely national or solely European seem to decrease among the delegates; 9% perceive themselves solely as national identity from 12% in the former survey and 3% solely as European from 7% in the former survey (see Graph 37).




Graph 37: Perception of one's own identity

The feeling of EU citizenship has increased according to the Eurobarometer. Those who do not feel EU citizenship at all, are calculated as 42% of the EU citizens, definitely more than the 9% of the delegates of the EL Congress (see Graph 37.1).




Graph 37.1: Perception of one's own identity Eurobarometer 40 years

Most people perceiving themselves only in terms of their own nationality are to be found among those coming from Southern Europe (14% of them), while less people perceiving themselves through national identities come from Western Europe (3%). At the same time more European than through national identities are those who come from Western Europe, since 29% of them state firstly their European identity and their national as complementary (see Graph 37.2).



Graph 37.2: Perception of one's own identity by region

Turning on the dimension of age, one could mention that the more strong perception of oneself as national only come from the age group more than 65 years old (22%). Mentioning of European identity is unanimous to delegates of the age between 18 and 24. Finally, the highest percentage of solely European identification is to be witnessed in the age group 45-54, representing the 7% of their delegates (see Graph 37.3).




Graph 37.3: Perception of one's own identity by age



### 3.5 Democracy in the European Union

Among the delegates more than half of them witness the problematic concerning the functioning of democracy in their country; 57% answers “not at all satisfied”. The results are similar to the ones of the former survey (see Graph 38).




Graph 38: Perception of democracy functioning in one's own country


Focusing on the trends of democracy functioning on the state level and the EU level, through the special edition of the Eurobarometer, one could see that 58% declare dissatisfied from democracy functioning in the country level, whereas 42% declare satisfied. On the whole EU citizens are more satisfied than the delegates of the EL Congress (See Graph 38.1).



Graph 38.1: Democracy functioning in the countries and in the EU “40 years Eurobarometer”




The more dissatisfied regions of Europe on the functioning of democracy in the state level is Southern Europe and Northern Europe, where their delegates confess at 67% of the samples that they are not at all satisfied (54% and 42% accordingly in the former survey). However, a significant 7% exists in Northern Europe being satisfied from democracy functioning in the state (see Graph 38.2)




Graph 38.2: Perception of democracy functioning in one's own country by region

The most dissatisfied age groups concerning democracy functioning in the state level, is the one between 18 and 24, for whom dissatisfaction is unanimous (60% not at all satisfied, 40% not very satisfied) and the one between 25 and 34 (80% dissatisfied). The results are similar to the former survey (see Graph 38.3).




Graph 38.3: Perception of democracy functioning in one’s own country by age

The functioning of democracy seems to be even more dissatisfying in the EU level than the one on the state level for the delegates and significantly deteriorated compared to the former survey 96% from 89% (see Graph 39). This deterioration should be related with the encounter of the crisis and the functioning of the different actors that compose the EU. However, the image of the Eurobarometer (see Graph 38.1) is totally different, since 46% of EU citizens declare dissatisfied while 44% declare satisfied.



Graph 39: Perception of democracy functioning in the EU level


The most satisfied region of Europe concerning the functioning of democracy is according to its delegates Eastern Europe and Turkey from whom, only 34% declare to be not at all satisfied and there are 11% of the delegates that confess fairly satisfied (see Graph 39.1).



Graph 39.1: Perception of democracy functioning in the EU level by region


### 3.6 *Impact of EU membership*

Almost half of the delegates perceive the impact of the EU on their countries as harmful (47%) while 31% perceive their countries as benefited from the EU. Compared to the former survey those perceived their countries harmed from the EU have increased (38% in the former) and those that think neither harmed, neither benefited have decreased analogously, 17% from 28% (see Graph 40).




Graph 40: Perception of impact of the EU on one's country

According to the Eurobarometer the image is reversed, with those who feel benefited representing the 54% of the EU citizens, while those who feel harmed represent the 37% of the EU citizens (see Graph 40.1).



Graph 40.1: Perception of impact of the EU on one's country Eurobarometer


The parts of Europe from which delegates feel most benefited are Western Europe and Eastern Europe and Turkey; 47% and 46% (29% and 40% in the former survey) of the delegates perceive their countries as benefited accordingly. Surprisingly enough, Northern European delegates feel the most harmed from the functioning of the EU on their countries, summing a total of 87% of their delegates that think being harmed from the EU (54% in the former survey). Furthermore, delegate from Southern Europe used to perceive themselves as more benefited, 29% in the former survey thought being benefited, turned out to see themselves as less benefited (14%) and more harmed 51% from 42% (see Graph 40.2).



Graph 40.2: Perception of impact of the EU on one's country by region

### 3.7 Party's policy


A non negligible part of the delegates advocates exiting of the EMU for his/her own country (30%). This finding could be related with the ongoing crisis and the policies driven from the ECB and the other bodies of the EMU, as well as with the findings for the dissatisfaction of the delegates on the functioning of democracy on the EU level (see Graph 41).



Graph 41: Views on advocating the exit from the EMU


In accordance with previous findings concerning the perception of the EU for the Northern European delegates, they ask almost unanimously (89%) exiting from the EMU. Second region in popularity of an EMU exit for a country according to its delegates' answers is Southern Europe, where 29% advocate exit from the EMU, a finding that is not unrelated with the ongoing economic crisis.






Graph 41.1: Views on advocating the exit from the EMU by region

The two age groups advocating an exit from the EMU for their countries are the two younger i.e. the one between 18 and 24 (80% of them) and the other between 25 and 34 (67% of them). On the other hand, the age groups being more hostile against the possibility of an EMU exit for one country are the older ones, since the group between 45 and 54 declares at a percentage of 84% no to the choice of an EMU exit, 84% of the age group between 55 and 64 and 75% of those who are more than 65 years old (see Graph 41.2).




Graph 41.2: Views on advocating the exit from the EMU by age

The equivalent percentage of the delegates advocating an exit from the EU is smaller than the one of exit from the EMU (22%). This finding is in line with the increasing disappointment and dissatisfaction towards the democratic functioning in the EU, and is somehow related to the disappointment related with the functioning of political actors in the EU, even though the EU is less to blame on the management of the crisis according to the delegates (see Graph 42).




Graph 42: Views on advocating the exit from the EU

Again, the delegates from Northern Europe seem to have the most hostile attitude towards the EU. In that vein, the anti-EU finding should be better understood from the perspective that Northern European delegates feel severely harmed from the EU and the belief that their states could better function outside the EU. Though, the most severely hit countries, those of the Southern Europe do not seem to propose an exit from the EU, since only 9% of them proposes it. In any case, they seem to distinguish from the EMU and the EU in terms of the reasoning of the crisis.




Graph 42.1: Views on advocating the exit from the EU by region

Almost unanimous among the delegates (95%) is the view that their national parties believe in the radical transformation of society (see Graph 43).




Graph 43: Perception of the transformational will of one's own party

When turning on the question on the geographical and political context of the transformation of society the findings are rather interesting. The majority of delegates believe that transformation is feasible only in a supra-national level (64%), while a rather significant 28% of the delegates believes in the “national way” to socialism (see Graph 44).



Graph 44: Perception of feasibility of transformation within one country

An interesting antiphesis is sketched when looking on the regional dimension of the answers to the question of the feasibility of social transformation on a supra-national or national level. More precisely, the vast majority of delegates from Northern Europe seem to share the view that transformation is feasible in a supranational level (80%), and at the same time, they propose exit from the EMU and the EU. Also, delegates from Southern Europe seem to find feasible socialism in an international level (78%). Finally less than half of the delegates coming from Western Europe find a presupposition sine qua non to socialism the transformation at the international level, while 36% of them find possible the social transformation within the level of the state (see Graph 44.1).




Graph 44.1: Perception of feasibility of transformation within one country by region

## 4. EVALUATION OF THE EL PARTY BY THE DELEGATES AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS

### 4.1 *Discourse on political identity*

The anticapitalist identity is the most common in the discourse on the EL among the delegates representing the 24,4% of them (19% in the former survey). Also, the alternative identity, represents a significant part of the delegates (19,5% from 15%). The transformative identity seems to fade between the two congresses (12,8% from 15%). Surprisingly enough post-communist and communist identities are not plausible among the delegates (1,7% and 2,8% accordingly). Finally, the identities “radical”, “democratic socialist”, as political identities and “left-green” and “feminist” as identities more related to the movements all move around a percentage of 5% (see Graph 45).




Graph 45: Best description of the EL discourse today

#### 4.2 Clarity of policies

The most clear policy issues from the EL as perceived from the delegates is elaborated in the fields of human rights (88%), gender equality (87%), unemployment (86%), immigration (78%), economic crisis (77%). However, there are issues that delegates perceive the EL not having clear policies, namely, sports (19%), judicial and police cooperation (31%), crime (31%) and technological and scientific research (36%), providing possible issues for further clarification for the EL and deepening the conversation on them (see Graph 46).






Graph 46: Evaluation of EL policies on various policy areas

### 4.3 Evaluation of the EL bodies


In the same spirit with the former survey, delegates, largely speaking, cannot express a view towards evaluating the EL bodies. In some cases their inability is more eloquent, such as their views “don’t know” expressed when asked to evaluate the council of chairpersons take the merit 52% from 40%. The most able to express a view are delegates when asked on the functioning of the networks, where 59% evaluate them positively (53% in the former survey). Furthermore, rather negative evaluations have diminished when evaluating all the bodies of the EL; 7% for the council of chairpersons, 5% concerning the executive board, 6% for the secretariat, 5% for the network and 6% for the working groups (from 9%, 7%, 8%, 9% and 9% accordingly in the former survey). On the whole, it is rather evident that the information shared by delegates regarding the functioning of the bodies is limited, since “don’t know” answers represent a percentage of more than 40% of the delegates on average (see Graph 47).



Graph 47: Evaluation of EL bodies


#### 4.4 Impact of the EL on national parties

The impact of the EL party on the national parties seems to be growing as witnessed by the delegates. Those who mention a very strong or a fairly strong impact represent the 40% of the delegates (35% in the former survey). Also, those who mention no significant impact on their national parties have decreased to 17% of the delegates from 26% in the former survey (see Graph 48).



Graph 48: Evaluation of the EL impact on one's own party


Worth to mention that the most influenced parties according to the views of the delegates are those from Eastern Europe; 20% of them mention the impact as very strong; 57% on the whole mention a strong or fairly strong impact something that could be understood having in mind the transition of the traditional Marxist of the ex-soviet union to the more modern politics of the EL. The less influenced parties according to the answers of their delegates are those coming from Western Europe, since only 30% mention some influence on their parties from the EL. Only 9% of the delegates from Southern Europe mention their parties as "not at all influenced" representing the looser percentage among the regional delegates (see Graph 48.1).



Graph 48.1: Evaluation of the EL impact on one's own party by region


#### 4.5 Impact of the EL on EU politics

Along with the increased influence of the EL party on national parties, there is an increased influence on EU politics from the part of the EL, perceived by the delegates that was further confirmed by the results of the Euro-elections, where the EL strengthened (6,25% from 4,13% in 2009 elections). Those who mention a strong or a fairly strong influence of the EL on the EU politics have increased to 14% from 10% of the delegates in the former survey. Also, those who mention no influence on EU politics have significantly decreased; 25% of the delegates from 31% in the former survey (see Graph 49).



Graph 49: Evaluation of the EL impact on EU politics


Focusing on the regional dimension of the impact of the EL on EU politics (Graph 49.1) the sketch is similar to Graph 48.1. The delegates coming from Eastern Europe perceive the greatest influence on EU politics from the EL party. Also, those who witness no influence at all in the EU politics are the most numerous when looking on the delegates from Western Union (38%). On the whole, results are similar to the former survey, though moving towards an appreciation of larger impact.



Graph 49.1: Evaluation of the EL impact on EU politics

#### 4.6 Euro-elections


The perception of the delegates concerning the interest of the electorate body coincides with the final turnout of the Euro-elections. According to the delegates a sum of 37% of the electorate body are somewhat or very interested, very close to the final turnout of the Euro-elections of 2014 (42,5%). The percentage for those perceived to be disinterested or very disinterested according to the delegates was 60%.



Graph 50: Perception of the interest of the electorate body


The regional dimension of the perception of the electorate body's interest coincides largely with the regional dimension of turnout. More precisely, delegates perceive the interest of the people of their countries as quite high in Southern Europe (50% very or somewhat interested), and in Northern Europe (47% very or somewhat interested) same for Eastern Europe. Albeit, only 13% of the delegates from Western Europe find some kind of interest in 2014 elections for the inhabitants of their countries (see Graph 50.1).






Graph 50.1: Perception of the interest of the electorate body by region

Graph 50.2 depicts the vote-turnout per country in the Euro-elections 2014. In contrast to the findings of the Graph 50.1, Eastern Europe on the whole has the lesser turnout in the elections of 2014, whereas Western Europe has a turnout averaging between 30% and 40%. Southern Europe is the region with the highest turnouts as witnessed in the former graph (see Graph 50.2).




Graph 50.2: Turnout in the Euro-elections 2014

In general, older delegates perceive the people of their countries as rather disinterested or very disinterested; 76% among those aged more than 65 years old perceive the people of Europe as disinterested; 65% among those aged between 55 and 64, 58% among those aged between 45 and 54, 48% among those between 35 and 44, 44% among those between 25 and 34 and 40% among the youngest group (see Graph 50.3).




Graph 50.3: Perception of the interest of the electorate body by age

Almost all delegates are very or somewhat interested on the elections of 2014 (96%) as expected (see Graph 51).




Graph 51: Self-interest on the elections of 2014

In the same vein, the high interest on the elections is translated in high likelihood of vote. 88% of the delegates answer that they will definitely vote (see Graph 52).




Graph 52: Likelihood axis of vote among the delegates

A surprisingly large part of the electorate body is perceived by the delegates to determine its vote in the Euro-elections by means of national issues (76%). This finding denotes that the EU is more the field of national antagonisms for the electorate body as perceived from the delegates. In other words, according to the people of Europe the EU is not the place for solidarity for European people and states and not the place that they could affect contemporary EU politics, but to a greater extent affect their national contemporary politics (see Graph 53).




Graph 53: Perception of the issues that affect the EU electorate body for the Euro-elections

The regional dimension is quite eloquent, Western European delegates are the ones that perceive their fellows in their countries to believe more in the European issues (28%) to be solved through the Euro-elections (see Graph 53.1).




Graph 52.1: Likelihood axis of vote among the delegates by region

The EL campaign during the Euro-elections of 2009 was found rather helpful for the majority of the delegates, since 42% found it either very or fairly helpful while 36% found it not that helpful or not at all helpful. Surprisingly enough 23% of the delegates were not able to judge the EL campaign for the Euro-elections of 2009, something that could be understood given that part of the delegates are new-comers in the party of the EL (see Graph 53).



Graph 53: Perception of the helpfulness of the EL campaign during the Euro-elections of 2009


In accordance with the previous findings the fact that most people having no-knowledge (67%) are those coming from Northern Europe coinciding with the finding that the most new-comers come from the same region. Also, the fact that the EL campaign is witnessed to be helpful for the delegates of Eastern Europe and Turkey (62%) coincides with the fact that these delegates witness their parties the most influenced by the EL party (see Graph 53.1).



Graph 53.1: Perception of the helpfulness of the EL campaign during the Euro-elections of 2009 by region

#### 4.7 Political activities for the Euro-elections

The most effective political activities are witnessed among the delegates to be dialogue either with social movements or trade unions, campaigns and communication via social networks (78%, 77%, 74% and 75% accordingly). Signing petitions is thought to be the less effective political activity, mentioned only by the 42% of the delegates (see Graph 54).




Graph 54: Perception of effectiveness of political activities for the Euro-elections



#### 4.8 Cornerstones of the solution in the Euro-zone debt crisis

The majority of the delegates asks for a cancelation of a part of the debt as the primary solution of the Euro-zone's periphery debt crisis; 37,6% of the delegates (see Graph 55). In the same spirit, the discussion on the debt seems to be the most intriguing for the delegates of the EL Congress, seeming to monopolize the discussion of the left, bringing the debt auditing the second most plausible solution for the debt crisis (20,5% of the delegates). Albeit, the issue of development and growth as the primary means of exiting from the crisis seems to be less plausible, taking the answer "a Marshall plan" from the 15% of the delegates. Finally, the answer "default and exit from the Euro-zone accompanied by devaluation of national currency" gathers 7% of the answers of the delegates significantly lesser than the 30% asking the exit from the EMU among the delegates (see Graph 41).



Graph 55: Perception of the cornerstones for the solution of the Euro-zone periphery's debt crisis

## APPENDIX

### *Survey Details*

- The survey was conducted by Transform! Network and Nicos Poulantzas Institute during the 4<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Party of the European Left, held in Madrid on 12-15 December 2013
- Method: Sampling based on self-filling questionnaires
- Languages of questionnaire: English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Czech
- Number of questions: 71, allocated in 6 sections
- Sample size: 127 (57% of the delegates)
- The Survey followed the United Nations classification system on European sub-regions (Eastern Europe and Turkey, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe)

## *Parties according to the European regions*

### Eastern Europe and Turkey

- Party of the Left 'Fair world', Belarus
- Bulgarian Left, Bulgaria
- Party of Democratic Socialism, Czech Republic
- Workers Party of Hungary 2006, Hungary
- Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, Moldova
- Socialist Alliance, Romania
- Freedom and Solidarity Party, Turkey

### Northern Europe

- Left Party, Estonia
- SKP, Finland
- Left Alliance, Finland
- Red-Green Alliance, Denmark

### Southern Europe

- EUiA, Spain
- Left Bloc, Portugal
- United Left, Spain
- Coalition of the Radical Left, Greece
- Communist Refoundation party, Italy
- Communist Refoundation of San Marino, San Marino
- United and Alternative Left, Catalunya

### Western Europe

- Left Party, France
- Communist Party of Belgium-Wallonia-Brussels, Belgium
- Communist Party of France, France
- Labour Party of Switzerland, Switzerland
- Communist Party of Austria, Austria
- Unitary Left, France
- The Left, Germany
- The Left, Luxembourg

## QUESTIONNAIRE



(English)

in cooperation with Nicos Poulantzas Institute (Greece)

### 4<sup>TH</sup> EL CONGRESS

*Madrid, December 12 - 15, 2013*

Dear Comrade,

Please fill in the questionnaire by circling the numbers corresponding to the answers that describe your situation or opinion. Please use Q1a as an example

Q1a. Are you a delegate to this congress?

(ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Yes	1
No	2

THE FIRST SET OF QUESTIONS REFER TO YOUR MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN LEFT PARTY AND YOUR NATIONAL PARTY

**1.** In this congress you are a(n)

Delegate	1
Attendant	2

**2.** Are you a national party member or an individual member of the Party of the European Left (EL)?

Party member	1
Individual	2

3. If you are a party member, is your party a member or an observer of the EL?

Member	1
Observer	2

4. Are you a member of the youth organization of your party?

Yes	1
No	2

5. What is your position in your party or in its youth organization? (FILL THE HIGHEST POSITION YOU HOLD)

Grassroots member	1
Member of intermediate bodies(e.g. regional secretariat etc)	2
Member of higher bodies (e.g. central committee, party board etc)	3
Member of highest bodies (e.g. secretariat, executive committee etc)	4

6. How long have you been a member of your national party?

Less than 1 year	1
1-2 years	2
3-5 years	3
6-10 years	4
More than 10 years	5

7. Are you in a paid relationship with your party, EL or with an organization related to them?

Yes	1
No	2

**8.** What is your area of activity in the EL horizontal structures (networks, working groups)?

(SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)

Economic Policy	1
Education	2
Energy and Climate Policies	3
EL-FEM	4
Freedom and Civil Rights	5
Latin America	6
LGBT Queer	7
Middle East	8
Trade Unionist	9
Youth	10
Other	11
None	12

**9.** Are you now or have you ever been a member/participant in any of the following organisations?

(ONE ANSWER FOR EACH ORGANIZATION)

	Yes, now	Yes, in the past	No, never
Trade union	1	2	3
Business organization	1	2	3
Women's / feminist organization	1	2	3
Environmental group	1	2	3
Religious organization	1	2	3
Agricultural cooperative	1	2	3
Youth / student organization	1	2	3
Peace movement	1	2	3

European Social Forum	1	2	3
World Social Forum	1	2	3
Human Rights	1	2	3
ATTAC	1	2	3
Alter Summit	1	2	3
Political foundation	1	2	3

**10.** Were you a **delegate** to any of the previous EL congresses? (SELECT ALL THAT APPLY)

Rome (2004)	1
Athens(2005)	2
Prague (2007)	3
Paris (2010)	4
None of the above	5

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REFER TO NATIONAL POLITICS

**11.** What do you think about the economic crisis in your country? Has it reached its peak or the worst is still to come?

The crisis has reached its peak	1
The worst is still to come	2
Don't know	9

QUESTIONS 12-22 SHOULD BE ANSWERED ONLY BY DELEGATES OF NATIONAL PARTIES  
(INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS SKIP TO QUESTION 23)

**12.** How is your party responding to the crisis, on the national and international level? It is mainly fighting for (the)...

(UP TO 4 ANSWERS)

Regulation of the financial /banking system	1
Nationalisation / socialisation of the financial sector	2

Nationalisation / socialisation of main industries	3
Tax justice	4
Redistribution of wealth	5
Guaranteed Minimum Income	6
Boosting employment	7
Job security	8
Wage increases	9
An increase in unemployment benefits	10
Poverty alleviation	11
Different industrial policies	12
Green development	13
Economic democracy in the public and private sector	14
Restricting the power of shareholders	15
Reduction of public deficits (fiscal consolidation)	16
Re-targeting the rescue packages	17
Improvement of the position of youth, women and immigrants in society	18
Changing ECB policies	19
Abolition of, or changing the Stability and Growth Pact	20
Other	21
Don't know	99

**13.** Has the crisis influenced the attitude of your national party towards the EU?

Yes	1
No	2

**14.** Do you think that your party should advocate your country's exit from the euro-zone? **(EURO-ZONE MEMBERS ONLY)**

Yes	1
No	2

**15.** Do you think that your party should propose your country's exit from the European Union? **(EU MEMBERS ONLY)**

Yes	1
No	2

**16.** Which two of the following do you believe that constitutes the cornerstones for the solution of the Eurozone's periphery debt crisis?



(UP TO 2 ANSWERS)

Fiscal consolidation through primary budget surpluses	1
Cancelation of a part of the debt	2
Debt auditing	3
A Marshall plan	4
Lengthening of the debt maturity accompanied by lower interest rate	5
Default and exiting the euro zone accompanied by devaluation of national currency	6
Privatizations and using the revenues for servicing the debt	7
None	8
Don't know	9

**17.** Does your national party believe in the radical transformation of society (by superseding/replacing capitalism)?

Yes	1
No	2

IF "YES" TO QUESTION 17 CONTINUE TO QUESTION 18,

IF "NO" SKIP TO QUESTION 20

**18.** Which, according to your opinion, are the main agents of social transformation today?

(UP TO 2 ANSWERS)

Traditional working class	1
Precarious (insecure) workers	2
Unemployed	3
Immigrants	4
Women	5
Youth	6

Other	7
Don't know	9

**19.** Which, according to your opinion, are the main agents of political transformation today?

(UP TO 2 ANSWERS)

Political parties	1
Trade Unions	2
Social movements	3
Citizens initiatives	4
Other	5
Don't know	9

**20.** Some say that transformation is feasible within one country. Others support the view that transformation is feasible only at international level, e.g. Europe. What is your opinion on this issue?

National level	1
International level (e.g. Europe)	2
Don't know	9

**21.** How much, according to your view, have social movements (globalization critical, environmental, feminism, LGBTQ, human rights, etc.) influenced the ideology, policy and practice of your national party?

Very much	1
To some extent	2
Not that much / a little	3
Not at all	4
Don't know	9

**22.** In general, according to your view, does your national party see social movements as an antagonistic or a friendly force?

Definitely antagonistic	1
Rather antagonistic	2

Tend to be allies	3
Definitely allied	4
Don't know	9

**23.** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?

Very satisfied	1
Fairly satisfied	2
Not very satisfied	3
Not at all satisfied	4
Don't know	9

**24.** Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?

Very satisfied	1
Fairly satisfied	2
Not very satisfied	3
Not at all satisfied	4
Don't know	9

**25.** Would you say that, overall, your country has benefited from or been harmed by being a member of the European Union? (EU MEMBERS ONLY)

Benefited	1
Neither benefited, nor been harmed	2
Harmed	3
Don't know	9

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REFER TO THE PARTY OF THE EUROPEAN LEFT (EL)

**26.** In your opinion, what is the impact of the European Left Party's (EL) presence and political action on European politics (EU)?

Very strong	1
Fairly strong	2
Not that strong	3
Not at all strong	4

Don't know	9
------------	---

**27.** In your opinion, what is the impact of the European Left Party's (EL) presence and political action on your party's life?

Very strong	1
Fairly strong	2
Not that strong	3
Not at all strong	4
Don't know	9

**28.** How do you evaluate each of the following European Left Party (EL) authorities?

(ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR EVERY AUTHORITY)

	Very positively	Rather positively	Rather negatively	Very negatively	Don't know
Council of Chairpersons	1	2	3	4	9
Executive board	1	2	3	4	9
Secretariat	1	2	3	4	9
Networks	1	2	3	4	9
Working groups	1	2	3	4	9

**29.** Which three of the following words best describe the European Left Party's discourse (e.g. programmatic documents, manifesto, rhetoric) today?

(UP TO 3 ANSWERS)

Anticapitalist	1
Traditional	2
Alternative	3
Modern	4
Parochial(narrow minded)	5
Moderate	6
Transformative	7
Radical	8
Vague	9

Reformist	10
Utopian	11
Realistic	12
Post-communist	13
Revisionist	14
Democratic Socialist	15
Left-Green	16
Feminist	17
Communist	18
Other	19
Don't know	99

**30.** In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 1 to 10,

where 1 means “left” and 10 means “right”. Which number best describes **your position?**

Left

Right

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

**31.** And where, on the same scale, would you place your **national party?** (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Left

Right

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

**32.** And where, on the same scale, would you place the Party of the **European Left (EL)** (ONE ANSWER ONLY)

Left

Right

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

**33.** For each of the following thematic issues, do you think that the Party of the European Left has a clear (well-defined) policy?

(ONE ANSWER ONLY FOR EVERY AREA)

	Very clear	Fairly clear	Not that clear	Not clear at all	Don't know
Environment	1	2	3	4	9
Technological and scientific research	1	2	3	4	9
EU enlargement	1	2	3	4	9
Energy	1	2	3	4	9
Immigration	1	2	3	4	9
Economic Crisis / countries with economic difficulties	1	2	3	4	9
Role of European Central Bank	1	2	3	4	9
Crime	1	2	3	4	9
Enterprise / market competition	1	2	3	4	9
Agriculture and fishing	1	2	3	4	9
Inflation	1	2	3	4	9
Euro	1	2	3	4	9
Consumer rights	1	2	3	4	9
Transportation	1	2	3	4	9
Economy	1	2	3	4	9
Unemployment	1	2	3	4	9
Health	1	2	3	4	9
Education	1	2	3	4	9
Social welfare	1	2	3	4	9
Taxation	1	2	3	4	9
Pensions	1	2	3	4	9
Human rights	1	2	3	4	9
International relations	1	2	3	4	9
Security and defence	1	2	3	4	9
Judicial and police cooperation	1	2	3	4	9
LGBT rights	1	2	3	4	9

Sports	1	2	3	4	9
Gender equality	1	2	3	4	9
Culture	1	2	3	4	9
Terrorism	1	2	3	4	9

**34.** In the near future, which 3 areas should be the priority for the Party of the European Left?

(UP TO 3 ANSWERS)

Environment	1
Techonological and Scientific Research	2
EU Enlargement	3
Energy	4
Immigration	5
Economic Crisis / Countries With Economic Difficulties	6
Role of European Central Bank	7
Crime	8
Enterprise / Market Competition	9
Agriculture and Fishing	10
Inflation	11
Euro	12
Consumer Rights	13
Transportation	14
Economy	15
Unemployment	16
Health	17
Education	18
Social Welfare	19
Taxation	20
Pensions	21
Human Rights	22
International relations	23
Security and Defence	24
Judicial and Police Cooperation	25
LGBT Rights	26
Sports	27

Gender Equality	28
Culture	29
Terrorism	30
Don't know	99

**35.** The next European election will be held in May 2014. How interested or disinterested would you say that the electorate is in these elections?

Very in terested	1
Somewhat interested	2
Somewhat disinterested	3
Very disinterested	4
Don't know	9

**36.** The next European election will be held in May 2014. How interested or disinterested would you say you are in these elections?

Very in terested	1
Somewhat interested	2
Somewhat disinterested	3
Very disinterested	4
Don't know	9

**37.** Could you tell me on a scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you would vote in the next European election in May 2014? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "definitely would not vote" and 10 means "definitely would vote".

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

**38.** On what kind of issues do you believe that voters cast their votes on European elections?

Nation al issues	1
European issues	2
Don't know	9

**38.** On what kind of issues do you believe that voters cast their votes on European elections?



National issues	1
European issues	2
Don't know	9

**39.** Among the following themes, which are according to your opinion those that the electoral campaign for the next European elections should concentrate on?

(UP TO 3 ANSWERS)

Economic growth	1
Unemployment	2
Inflation and purchasing power	3
The future of pensions	4
Crime	5
The fight against climate change	6
Immigration	7
Terrorism	8
The role of EU in international scene	9
Agriculture	10
The Euro	11
The preservation of EU social model	12
European values and identity	13
The power and competence of the European institutions	14
Other	15
Don't know	99

**40.** How helpful was the plan (documents, meetings, electoral platform) of the Party of the European Left on your campaign during the European elections 2009

Very helpful	1
Fairly helpful	2
Not that helpful	3
Not at all helpful	4
Don't know	9

**41.** How effective you think various political activities are in helping the European Left in the forthcoming European elections?

	Very effective	Effective	Not very effective	Not at all effective	Don't know
Campaigns	1	2	3	4	9
Demonstrations	1	2	3	4	9
Signing petitions	1	2	3	4	9
Activisms	1	2	3	4	9
Circulation of the program	1	2	3	4	9
Communicate via social networks	1	2	3	4	9
Develop dialogue with trade unions	1	2	3	4	9
Develop dialogue with movements	1	2	3	4	9

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REFER TO TRANSFORM

**42.** Are you informed about the activities of the European Network of Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue - "Transform!"?

Yes	1
No	2

IF "YES" TO QUESTION 42 CONTINUE TO QUESTION 43, IF "NO" SKIP TO QUESTION 51

**43.** What is your opinion of Transform?

Very good	1
Rather good	2
Rather bad	3
Very bad	4
Don't know	9

**44.** Do you receive transform! newsletter?

Yes	1
No	2

**45. How often do you read Transform! Newsletter? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

Once a month (every newsletter)	1
Once in two months	2
Every 3 to 5 months	3
Every 6 to 12 months	4
Less often	5
Never	6

**46. What is your opinion of the Transform! Newsletter?**

Very good	1
Rather good	2
Rather bad	3
Very bad	4
Don't know	9

**47. Do you know the journal Transform!**

Yes	1
No	2

**48. How often do you read the journal Transform! ?**

Once in 6 months (every journal)	1
Once a year	2
Less often	3
Never	4

**49. What is your opinion of the journal Transform! ?**

Very good	1
Rather good	2
Rather bad	3
Very bad	4
Don't know	9

**50. How often do you participate in either Transform's activities or its members' activities?**

Very often	1
Quite often	2
Rarely	3
Never	4
Don't know	9

THE FOLLOWING FEW QUESTIONS REFER TO PERSONAL VALUES

**51.** Please indicate if you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or totally disagree with each of the following statements.

(ONE ANSWER ONLY IN EVERY PROPOSITION)

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Don't know
Immigrants should be allowed to retain their own customs	1	2	3	4	9
Same-sex marriages should be allowed by law	1	2	3	4	9
Major public services and industries ought to be publicly owned	1	2	3	4	9
Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion	1	2	3	4	9
Schools must teach children to obey authority	1	2	3	4	9
Economic growth must be a priority, even if it affects the environment	1	2	3	4	9
Personal consumption of cannabis should be legalised	1	2	3	4	9
Immigrants contribute a lot to my country	1	2	3	4	9
Central planning is the best guarantee for economic prosperity	1	2	3	4	9

Violence can be justified as a means of social and political struggle	1	2	3	4	9
Religion in my country is very important	1	2	3	4	9

**52.** How do you see yourself? In terms of “Your own nationality” **only** (e.g. French, Danish, German, Portuguese), both in terms of “Your own nationality” **and** as European, as European **and** in terms of “Your own nationality”, or as European **only**?

(Your own nationality) only	1
(Your own nationality) and European	2
European and (your own nationality)	3
European only	4
Don't know	9

**53.** People differ in how they think of or describe themselves. Which in the following list are most important to you in describing who you are?

(UP TO 3 ANSWERS)

Your social class	1
Your national identity	2
Your age group/generation	3
Your gender	4
Your religion	5
The place (village or town) where you live	6
Your ethnic group	7
The job that you do (or did)	8
Your political allegiances	9
Other	10
None	11

AND, FINALLY, THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS CONCERN PERSONAL DATA

**54.** You are...

Male	1
Female	2

**55.** What is your age?

18-24 years old	1
25-34 years old	2
35-44 years old	3
45-54 years old	4
55-64 years old	5
65+ years old	6

**56.** You are .

Married	1
In a civil partnership	2
Unmarried - live with parents/relatives	3
Unmarried - live with partner	4
Unmarried - live with home mate(s)	5
Unmarried - live alone	6
Widowed	7
Divorced	8
Separated	9

**57.** Do you have children?

Yes	1
No	2

**58.** What is the highest level of education you have completed?

Primary	1
Secondary	2
Vocational/ technical	3
University degree	4
Master's degree	5

PhD	6
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59. Do you live in a rural area or village, in a small or middle size town, in the suburbs of a large city, or in a large city?

Rural area or village	1
Small or middle-sized town	2
Suburbs of large town or city	3
Large town or city	4

60. In which part of Europe do you live?

Austria	1
Belarus	2
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	4
Czech Republic	5
Cyprus	6
Denmark	7
Estonia	8
Finland	9
France	10
Germany	11
Greece	12
Hungary	13
Italy	14
Luxemburg	15
Republic of Moldavia	16
Poland	17
Portugal	18
Romania	19
San Marino	20
Slovakia	21
Spain	22
Switzerland	23
Turkey	24
Other	25

61. Where you born or/and raised in the country where you currently live?

Yes	1
No	2

62. What is your current work situation? If you now hold a full-time political mandate, please note your occupation before being elected / located.

Self-employed	1
Employed full time	2
Employed part time	3
In school / still studying	4
Working in the household	5
Military/ Civil service	6
Retired	7
Unemployed	8
Other	9

63. You are/were working in.

Agriculture	1
State industry	2
Private industry	3
Public services	4
Private services	5
Other	6

64. Please pick one box for your current job (if you are now retired/ unemployed/ do household work/ have a full-time political mandate, then please pick a box that describes your last job)

<b>Professional and technical</b> (for example: doctor, teacher, intellectual, engineer, artist, accountant)	1
<b>Higher administrative</b> (for example: banker, executive in big business, high government official, union official)	2
<b>Clerical</b> (for example: secretary, clerk, office manager, civil servant, bookkeeper)	3



<b>Sales</b> (for example: sales manager, shop owner, shop assistant, insurance agent, buyer)	4
<b>Service</b> (for example: restaurant owner, police officer, waitress, barber, caretaker, nurse)	5
<b>Skilled worker</b> (for example: foreman, motor mechanic, printer, seamstress, tool and die maker, electrician)	6
<b>Semi-skilled worker</b> (for example: bricklayer, bus driver, cannery worker, carpenter, sheet metal worker, baker)	7
<b>Unskilled worker</b> (for example: labourer, porter, unskilled factory worker, cleaner)	8
<b>Farm worker</b> (for example: farm labourer, tractor driver)	9
Farm proprietor, farm manager	10
Still in education	11
I have never had a paid job	12

65. What is the annual income of your household?

Up to 1.000 €	1
From 1.001 to 5.000 €	2
From 5.001 to 10.000 €	3
From 10.001 to 20.000 €	4
From 20.001 to 30.000 €	5
From 30.001 to 50.000 €	6
From 50.001 to 70.000 €	7
From 70.001 to 100.000 €	8
Over 100.000 €	9

66. Do you speak any of the following languages? IF YES: What is your level? (ONE ANSWER FOR EACH LANGUAGE)

	NO	Yes, good	Yes, very good	Yes, fluent
English	1	2	3	4
French	1	2	3	4
German	1	2	3	4
Russian	1	2	3	4
Italian	1	2	3	4

Spanish	1	2	3	4
Other	1	2	3	4

**67.** How religious would you say you are?

Very religious	1
Quite religious	2
Not that religious	3
Not religious at all	4

**68.** Do you use the computer? If yes, where do you use it?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work,	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
No, I don't use a computer	4

SKIP THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF YOU DO NOT USE A COMPUTER

**69.** Do you use the internet? If yes, where do you use it?

Yes, at home	1
Yes, at work,	2
Yes, both at home and work	3
No, I don't use the internet	4

**70.** How often do you use the internet?

Daily	1
3-4 times a week	2
1-2 times a week	3
1-2 times a month	4
Less often	5
Never	6

SKIP THE FOLLOWING QUESTION IF YOU DO NOT USE THE INTERNET

71. How often do you visit.?

	Daily	3-4 times a week	1-2 times a week	1-2 times a month	Less often	Never
The website of the Party of the European Left ( <a href="http://www.european-left.org">http://www.european-left.org</a> )	1	2	3	4	5	6
Transform's website ( <a href="http://www.transform-network.net">http://www.transform-network.net</a> )	1	2	3	4	5	6

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH!!**

