With only four weeks to go before the vote on 9 June, we can take an initial look at voters’ choices on the basis of the major trends that have emerged from the campaign and opinion polling. One of these trends is the fundamental uncertainty surrounding the result. These uncertainties stem from the unknowns of developments in the country’s political and social conditions – and the international context – in relation to the government’s policies and to Emmanuel Macron, the level of turnout, hesitations, and possible changes in voters’ choices, right up to voting day.
While the final choice of voters remains open, all the surveys predict that the far-right RN list (Rassemblement national de Marine Le Pen – formerly Front National) will come out on top, estimated at around 30%, well ahead of the other lists. Back in 2019, Marine Le Pen’s list came in just behind the Renaissance list (Macron majority) (23.24% against 22.19%). This time the gap widened with the Macron-backed list predicted to receive just 18%. The far right’s lead remains undisputed. This is one of the major challenges of these elections. The other lists are now in competition, both to challenge the RN’s predicted high ranking and to secure the best place. In this respect, it is important to bear in mind that the results of each list will influence the balance of power in the run-up to the 2027 presidential election.
Today, the electoral balance of power shows the following panorama, in the aftermath of the 2022 presidential and legislative elections. In the 1st round of the presidential election, the concentration of the electorate around the 3 candidates who came out on top (Macron 28%, Le Pen 23%, Jean Luc Mélenchon 22%) crushed the other forces on the parliamentary spectrum, none of them reaching 5% (conservative right 4.8%, ecologists 4.6%, Communist Party 2.3%, PS 1.8%). In the run-up to the legislative elections, the RN increased its number of elected members from 2 to 89, while the left-wing and ecologist parties united around an electoral agreement, the NUPES (Nouvelle union populaire écologiste et sociale), brought together 131 MPs (each party forming its own group) and Les Républicains (LR) 61. With 245 MPs, Macron did not obtain an absolute majority.
Predictable changes in an uncertain context
The configuration that resulted from the presidential election is likely to be redefined by the European elections. Macron’s influence is declining, the far right is on the rise, and there are possible shifts in the balance of power within the left. The movements to be followed will be structured around strategies of conquest or defense, in competitions for influence, or even duels, in a configuration, I stress, that is very fluid and prone to surprises. These movements in the electoral sphere must be read in the light of the tensions that have marked the country in recent years.
For the presidential Macron’s party, it is a question of reducing the gap with the far right, and on the other hand of not being overwhelmed by the progress of the social-democrat candidate Raphaël Glucksmann, even though this gap is narrowing in the latest estimates. The right, whose electorate is being solicited by Macron and the RN, is aiming with 6 or 7% to remain in the European Parliament.
On the left, the rise of Raphaël Glucksmann (now around 14%) is challenging the leadership of La France Insoumise, which had benefited from Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s performance in the presidential elections. For the time being, it remains at around its 2019 level (between 7% and 8%). The ecologists are no longer benefiting from the wave of 2019. With an estimate of 6 or 7%, they are a long way from the 13.5% obtained by Yannick Jadot. The PCF, which was not represented in 2019, is aiming for 5% to make a comeback in the EP, with a rallying list (coalition list, consisting of left wing and social movement candidates).
Doubts and uncertainties
This account, which was prepaed at the end of April, should be read with caution. As the campaign intensifies, changes and even reversals in trends are to be expected. Firstly, because of the uncertainties and hesitations in voters’ choices. 37% say that their choice may change until elections day. The volatility of the electorate is confirmed, with a weakening attachment to a specific electoral choice. This is particularly true of young people and the working classes. It is the “undecided” who will ultimately decide the outcome. For example, Raphaël Glucksmann’s rise is due to him attracting Socialist voters disappointed by Macron and Mélenchon who no longer identify with Mélenchon and are returning to traditional social democracy. The upward momentum of the PS/Place publique (PS/PP) list in the polls may encourage a “strategic vote” movement by ecologist and PCF voters in its favour. However, the studies all stress the fragility of these transfers.
A few trends in public opinion are worth noting:
– The diminished significance of the divide between “pro” and “anti” Europeans and a resurgence of the traditional divide between right and left,
- the interpenetration of European and national issues,
- the challenge of mobilising the working classes.
Against this backdrop of uncertainty, these elections are of interest. When it comes to support for European integration, 73% of French people say they are in favour, including 80% of young people. No political force is calling for an exit from the EU (polling shows only 14% support for a Frexit). At the same time, 54% say they disagree with current EU policies.
Political division regarding the EU is between those who advocate the continuation of the project, or who advocate further EU federalism (Renaissance Macronists, PS/Glucksmann, Ecologists) and those who are critical of the Union’s liberal economic model (with reference to the victory of the “No to the Constitutional Treaty” in 2005).
The argument that European policies influence or even determine national policies is double-edged. It can fuel headfirst rush toward further federalism, or it can, in the face of liberal policies of austerity, budgetary constraints and privatisation, encourage a closer link between Community guidelines and national policies, which are open to challenge. As the vote draws nearer, we see a nationalisation of the motivations for voting. Criticism and concerns about the current structure of the EU focus on the fight against global warming (36%) and the treatment of immigration (42%). On the other hand, the case most commonly presented by Emmanuel Macron as the pillar of a “strong Europe” receives only 28% and aid to Ukraine 13%.
A vote determined by domestic issues
Faced with Macron’s vision of a powerful Europe in which militarism is the priority, the June 2024 vote is increasingly determined by domestic policy issues: purchasing power, immigration, the healthcare system and, further afield, the environment. Despite voting less than the average, the under 35 age-group shows interest in common European policy issues. While they prioritize global warming more than the French population as a whole (44% versus 36%), they also emphasize social issues such as economic growth, the harmonization of social systems, and establishing a minimum wage. However, only 28% prioritize common defence and only 11% support aid for Ukraine.
The primacy of social questions for voters in the EP election corresponds to the concerns present in the domestic political climate: purchasing power, work, public services, health/schooling, housing. Criticism of the liberal orientation of the current EU construction is reflected in proposals to further strengthen European Community institutions. Voters are divided on whether common policies should be generalised (only 24%), with a majority (35%) in favour of refocusing on the member states, according to the most recent studies. The issue of “sovereignty” is being debated more in terms of the need for democracy and control – in the face of markets, liberal logic, social dumping, globalisation and free trade identified with unbridled competition – than in terms of a nationalist, identity-based withdrawal, including the racist and xenophobic dimensions of the extreme right.
Campaign themes and priorities for voter mobilisation
The RN intervenes as little as possible, if at all, on the basis of its programme. It sticks to making its image acceptable, while cultivating its identification with the fight against immigration and the “Islamic” threat, stoking fears and building on frustrations and social anger. In this sense, it belongs to the European family of extreme right-wing parties.
The Macronist candidates suffer from dissatisfaction with the government and distrust of the policies pursued at European level. Their list, headed by Valérie Hayet, must contend with its failure to challenge the RN list and the further narrowing gap in the polls with the Glucksmann list.
The situation on the left
The question sometimes arises as to the reasons for the diversity of the lists. For the 2022 legislative elections, following the presidential elections in which Jean-Luc Mélenchon obtained 22%, an electoral agreement was reached between the various parties, under the NUPES banner. For these European elections, the ecologists, socialists and communists have chosen to run on the basis of their individual party programs. The Ecologists hope to preserve their chance of a more favourable result than in 2022, even if they achieve less than in 2019. The Socialists consider there to be fundamental differences in their analysis of European construction and aim to assert themselves in the national context by freeing themselves from the balance of power resulting from the presidential election. The Communists wish to defend their own agenda and priorities in the debate. In addition, with the ambition of returning to Strasbourg, they argue that with the single-round proportional representation list system, seperate lists make it possible to obtain more left-wing MEPs than a single list. Thus, if the PCF/Gauche Unie (PCF/GU) list passes the 5% mark, that means 5 more elected representatives for the left, and 5 fewer for the right and far right. This strategy does not mean that there will be no agreements and alliances in the future, such as those decided for local or legislative elections.
Raphaël Glucksmann’s PS/PP list targets the centre-left electorate, making use of the left-wing divide on the issue of Ukraine, and an assumed federalist European commitment. The rapid and significant rise in the polls of the social democratic list he leads can be explained by the return of disappointed Macron voters and others distancing themselves from Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Faced with this competition, La France Insoumise cannot rely on the “strategic vote” to retain its dominant position on the left. They have focused their campaign on the question of Gaza, targeting the reservoir of votes represented by part of the youth of popular urban neighbourhoods. In Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s mind, these European elections are the first stage in the sequence leading up to the presidential election in 2027.
The ecologists have reached a plateau, faced with the priority given to social issues.
The PCF/GU list led by Communist Léon Deffontaines (28) focused its campaign on criticism of liberal and European policies – building on the victory of the “No vote” in 2005 – and in line with the rejection of Macron’s neoliberal reforms. It focuses on the labour issue, winning back the working classes (abstention and in the face of the Le Pen danger).
The objective of winning back and mobilising the working classes has become a strategic issue, given the levels of abstention[1] and the influence of the RN. For the Left, it is a question of addressing the feeling of neglect among these social strata – the working and middle classes – as the result of liberal policies. The campaign for these European elections is an opportunity to restore the centrality of the social question. It’s about restoring confidence in these groups. Confidence in the ability of politics and the left to respond to their problems. Confidence in the ability to control the country’s future. This is the prerequisite for reopening the prospect of change, and for rallying people together to bring about and implement real change. It is imperative if we are to roll back the progress of the far right and prevent it from coming to power.
Lists in contention (heads of list, likely EP groups:
LFI, La France Insoumise (Jean-Luc Mélenchon), led by Manon Aubry, GUE/The Left
PS/Place Publique, Raphaël Glucksmann, S&D
EELV, Europe Écologie/Les Verts, Marie Tousssaint, Les Verts/ALE
PCF/GU, Communist Party/United Left, Léon Deffontaines, GUE/The Left
Renaissance, (pro-Macron coalition), Valérie Hayet, Renews
LR, Les Républicains, conservative right, François-Xavier Bellamy, EPP
RN, Rassemblement national, far right (Marine Le Pen, ex-Front national), Jordan Bardella, ID group
Reconquête, far right (founded by Éric Zemmour,) Marion Maréchal (granddaughter of J.-M. Le Pen), ECR
References:
[1] In 2019, the turnout rate for the European elections was 50.1%. According to the Ipsos, Cevipof, Institut Montaigne, Fondation Jean Jaurès, Le Monde survey of 29 April 2024, 45% of registered voters surveyed intend to vote on 9 June 2024.
Ipsos, Cevipof, Institut Montaigne, Fondation Jean Jaurès, Le Monde, 29 April 2024.
On the working classes, see Les classes populaires à l’écart du politique? Actes du colloque de la Fondation Gabriel Péri, Paris 2022.
Cover-Photo: Lakov via Depositphotos.
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